The Clash of David and Goliath at Sea: The USS Cole Bombing as Sea Insurgency and Lessons for the ROK Navy

Abstract

On October 12, 2000, the USS Cole was attacked by a small band of Islamic (global) insurgents. Why would sea insurgents attack a professional warship that did not appear to be related to counterinsurgency? When are such attacks successful, and when are they not successful? Three dimensions-value, vulnerability, and learning-give convincing answers to this puzzle. I trace two cases: the USS Cole bombing and the USS Ashland and Kearsarge missile attack. I find that when the navy is equipped with a fast learning process and this reduces its vulnerability, sea insurgents' attacks are less successful. This strategic interaction dynamic is strongly applicable to South Korea under three subdynamics: alliance, commitment dilemma, and enhanced naval capabilities. Thus, the Republic of Korea Navy needs to establish a flexible strategy in its effort to effectively deal with nontraditional threats as well as traditional threats, such as North Korea.

Maritime Security in a Technological Era: Addressing Challenges in Balancing Technology and Ethics

“…Ports, as crucial hubs in international trade, are also vulnerable targets (Wenning et al, 2007). The 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen's port of Aden exemplifies how terrorist attacks can cause not only physical damage but also operational disruptions, leading to cargo delays and increased logistical costs (Ban, 2010). Beyond the immediate effects, the persistent threat of maritime terrorism escalates overall shipping costs.…”

Attack risk modelling for the San Diego maritime facilities

“…A profile of those cases reflects the difficulty in using their tactic because few terror groups have the mariner capability to execute this type of attack. It is tempting to conclude that terrorism is not a significant threat to military and merchant maritime operations because of this low frequency of successful maritime attacks (Ban, 2010). However, law enforcement and management efforts to coordinate and execute the International Maritime Organization and International Ship and the Port Facility Security Code requirements have been significant deterrents (Marine Insight, 2019).…”