The combined effect of marginal social and private benefit on the socially optimal equity structure of PPP projects

He, Yujia; Shi, Lei; Li, Zhongfu

doi:10.1080/01446193.2021.1974503

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…In the practice of PPP projects, "political support" plays a significant role in enhancing the value improvement potential of PPP projects [2]. However, it is essential to avoid excessive government regulation and control [46]. The government's ownership stake in project companies should be less than 50%, allowing for a greater allocation of control rights to private entities, thereby leveraging the advantages of private sector participation to the fullest extent.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…He et al's [46] research suggests that excessive government regulation may violate the principle of contractual freedom, thereby dampening the enthusiasm of private enterprises to participate in projects. The results of our study can be used to extend He et al's research and provide an explanation for the range of government shareholding ratios.…”

Section: The Relationship Between the Participating Entity's Benefits...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Research on the Value Improvement Model of Private Parties as “Investor–Builder” Dual-Role Entity in Major River Green Public–Private Partnership Projects

Zhang,

Feng,

Zhang

et al. 2023

Buildings

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In Public–Private Partnership (PPP) projects, the structure of the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) significantly impacts the value enhancement of projects. This study conducted a quantitative analysis of value enhancement in green PPP projects under single- and Dual-Role entity models and examined existing SPV private party compositions. A quantitative model was developed to enhance the value in green PPP projects through a Dual-Role “investor–builder” entity approach, comparing it with the single-role entity model. The findings indicate that in the Dual-Role entity mode, the construction party demonstrates a greater willingness to effort, resulting in shorter construction timelines and improved economic benefits for the project company. The preferred equity range for private parties escalates with the total project investment and the extent of “political support”. Nevertheless, a disproportionately high government stake in the equity is detrimental to the value enhancement in PPPs, and excessive government regulation and control should be avoided. This quantitative model serves as a decision-making criterion for selecting the SPV mode and provides an alternative approach for evaluating PPP project performance.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Relationship Between the Participating Entity's Benefits...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the Value Improvement Model of Private Parties as “Investor–Builder” Dual-Role Entity in Major River Green Public–Private Partnership Projects

Zhang,

Feng,

Zhang

et al. 2023

Buildings

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Quantitative VfM evaluation of urban rail transit PPP projects considering social benefit

Liu

Chen

et al. 2023

Research in Transportation Business & Management

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Effect of the Internal Agency Problem on Risk-Sharing Incentive Contracts in Public–Private Partnership Projects

Shi,

He,

Onishi

2023

J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

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The combined effect of marginal social and private benefit on the socially optimal equity structure of PPP projects

Cited by 7 publications

References 33 publications

Research on the Value Improvement Model of Private Parties as “Investor–Builder” Dual-Role Entity in Major River Green Public–Private Partnership Projects

Research on the Value Improvement Model of Private Parties as “Investor–Builder” Dual-Role Entity in Major River Green Public–Private Partnership Projects

Quantitative VfM evaluation of urban rail transit PPP projects considering social benefit

Effect of the Internal Agency Problem on Risk-Sharing Incentive Contracts in Public–Private Partnership Projects

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