Fine-grained cryptographic primitives are ones that are secure against adversaries with an apriori bounded polynomial amount of resources (time, space or parallel-time), where the honest algorithms use less resources than the adversaries they are designed to fool. Such primitives were previously studied in the context of time-bounded adversaries (Merkle, CACM 1978), space-bounded adversaries (Cachin and Maurer, CRYPTO 1997) and parallel-time-bounded adversaries (Håstad, IPL 1987). Our goal is come up with fine-grained primitives (in the setting of parallel-time-bounded adversaries) and to show unconditional security of these constructions when possible, or base security on widely believed separation of worst-case complexity classes. We show:1. NC 1 -cryptography: Under the assumption that NC 1 = ⊕L/poly, we construct one-way functions, pseudo-random generators (with sub-linear stretch), collision-resistant hash functions and most importantly, public-key encryption schemes, all computable in NC 1 and secure against all NC 1 circuits. Our results rely heavily on the notion of randomized encodings pioneered by Applebaum, Ishai and Kushilevitz, and crucially, make non-blackbox use of randomized encodings for logspace classes.2. AC 0 -cryptography: We construct (unconditionally secure) pseudo-random generators with arbitrary polynomial stretch, weak pseudo-random functions, secret-key encryption and perhaps most interestingly, collision-resistant hash functions, computable in AC 0 and secure against all AC 0 circuits. Previously, one-way permutations and pseudo-random generators (with linear stretch) computable in AC 0 and secure against AC 0 circuits were known from the works of Håstad and Braverman. * MIT.