The Complexity of Economies and Pluralism in Economics

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. AbstractFrom the two premises that (1) economies are complex systems and (2) the accumulation of knowledge about reality is desirable, I derive the conclusion that pluralism with regard to economic research programs is a more viable position to hold than monism. To substantiate this claim an epistemological framework of how scholars study their objects of inquiry and relate their models to reality is discussed.Furthermore, it is argued that given the current institutions of our scientific system, economics self-organizes towards a state of scientific unity. Since such a state is epistemologically inferior to a state of plurality, critical intervention is desirable.

Pluralism in economics: its critiques and their lessons

“…First, a level playing field requires scientific institutions that prevent the accumulation of academic power towards a single research program for purely structural reasons. Given the current institutions of the scientific system, however, different research programs accumulate academic power according to a path dependent and self-reinforcing process: those research programs with many adherents, much influence and greater power are likely to grow relatively fasterirrespective of their inherent quality, in whichever way the latter is determined (Dobusch & Kapeller, 2009;Gräbner, 2017;Sterman & Wittenberg, 1999). There are many mechanisms underlying this tendency to monopolization, all of which are empirically well documented.…”

“…There are many mechanisms underlying this tendency to monopolization, all of which are empirically well documented. These include, but are not limited to, the provision of educational programs and teaching material (which tend to stress topics, methods and concepts of the dominant paradigm), occupation of editorial boards and commissions (which are then more likely to decide in favor of the currently dominant paradigm) and very standardized criteria for the promotion within academia, which are more difficult to meet for scholars working outside the currently dominant paradigm (see Gräbner, 2017, for a more detailed discussion of these and further points). The latter point is also stressed in Akerlof (2020), who criticizes the extensive reliance on journal metrics for promotion processes, which hinders the consideration of new (and, thus, often less formalized) ideas and approaches (for this see also Heckman & Moktan, 2020).…”

“…Of course, one might conclude that 'non-mainstream' outlets are simply of lower quality and, therefore, not worth being referenced anyway. Yet such an interpretation does not align with the fact that 'mainstream' papers citing non-mainstream publications tend to have higher impact that those which do not (Aistleitner et al, 2017, p. 17; see also Gräbner, 2017). The more adequate answer is given by Colander (2010, p. 47): 'My honest answer to that question ['What does mainstream economics think of heterodox economics?']…”

“…Altogether, the level playing field assumed by proponents of the argument that pluralism would emerge on its own if there were a need for it does not exist and current academic institutions tend to accelerate a scientific monopolization (Gräbner, 2017). It is not clear at all how under such circumstances the scientific community should serve as a perfect selection machine of ideas and, thereby, establish a 'market test' à la Lazear (2000).…”

“…The call for pluralism in economics has gained a large number of supporters (e.g. Dobusch & Kapeller, 2009;Dow, 2004;Gräbner, 2017;Sent, 2006), yet it remains contested for various reasons (e.g. Becker, 2017;Hodgson, 2019a).…”