The Concept of Isēgoria

Abstract

This paper examines the concept of isēgoria. It looks especially at Herodotus, comparing his use of the term to that of other authors. The term does not primarily refer to ‘the equal right to speak in the assembly’. Rather, it is a ‘language ideology’ that characterizes the bearing of the free, full citizen. Isēgoria was a negative concept, defined by what it was not more than what it was: not flattery; not fearful; not indirect. Isēgoria could only exist in a community of complete equality, and was threatened when someone became too powerful or too important. It can best be translated as ‘the speech of equals before equals’.

The Marketplace of Ideas and the Agora: Herodotus on the Power of Isegoria

“…Artabanus’s opinion is daring; he speaks not to an audience of equals but in front of a despot. Therefore, his speech in defense of free debate is not itself free; he must flatter (Pelling 2006, 109), for speaking in front of despots is a fraught art (Forsdyke 2001; Gottesman 2021; Hohti 1975; Landauer 2019; Zali 2013). Despite this flattery, Xerxes is enraged: 14 “Artabanus, you are my father’s brother; that shall save you from a punishment adequate for your empty words” (7.11).…”

“…This will make plain the relationship between isegoria and diabole (trickery, deception). Gottesman contrasts these modes: “ Isegoria describes the experience in sharing in a community of equals, without any need to dissemble or flatter” (2021, 180) while conceding that sometimes equal speech still involves deceptive speech (189–90). Yet this assumes that diabole in isegoria is incidental and that the primary reason to dissemble is fear.…”

“…It is this unexpected emphasis that renders his account particularly fruitful for rethinking contemporary free speech 8 . Building on recent work treating isegoria as a “language ideology … of the free, full citizen among his peers” (Gottesman 2021, 197) and as a depiction of a “broader political culture” (Schlosser 2020, 77), I argue that Herodotus offers a nonepistemic account of the way the right to speak energizes participants in a political culture that entitles such participation. The goodness of isegoria lies not in its effects on speech but on the speakers (and audience).…”

“…5 For more on the history of isegoria, see Gottesman (2021), Hohti (1975), Lewis (1971), Naketegawa (1988), Rhodes (2018), andSchlosser (2020). For more on isegoria and parrhesia, see Carter (2004), Konstan (2012), Landauer (2012), Raaflaub (2004), andSaxonhouse (2006).…”

“…6 Translation David Grene (Herodotus 1987), with some emendations. 7 Naketgawa (1988); Gottesman (2021) for history of scholarship on isegoria. 8 Bejan (2021) also argues that isegoria helps reframe contemporary free speech debates, but her account is enmeshed in a legalistic/ epistemic framework that misses out on what is particularly novel about ancient isegoria.…”