The Concept of Nature and the Enhancement Technologies Debate

Nielsen, Lisbeth Witthøfft

doi:10.1002/9781444393552.ch2

Cited by 39 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…To consider the relationships between these concepts, we need to know what we mean by them. ‘Natural’ has many meanings in different cases and is difficult to define [ 10 , 11 ], and, in general, it is what is (not) artificial or is touched by humans [ 12 , 13 ].…”

Section: Defining Animal Welfare and Natural Behaviourmentioning

confidence: 99%

Naturalness and Animal Welfare

Yeates

2018

Animals

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Simple SummaryMany people feel that we should ensure that animals have natural lives and can perform natural behaviours. However, it is unclear what exactly we mean by ‘natural’ and how we can assess it scientifically. We might use naturalness to highlight possible suffering that needs looking into, as a rule of thumb about what is good for animals, and to establish a threshold for what is acceptable or unacceptable in how we affect animals. We can assess animals’ naturalness in terms of how similar they are to their closest wild counterparts, both in scientific assessments and in decisions about how we care for animals.AbstractNaturalness is considered important for animals, and is one criterion for assessing how we care for them. However, it is a vague and ambiguous term, which needs definition and assessments suitable for scientific and ethical questions. This paper makes a start on that aim. This paper differentiates the term from other related concepts, such as species-typical behaviour and wellbeing. It identifies contingent ways in which naturalness might be used, as: (i) prompts for further welfare assessment; (ii) a plausible hypothesis for what safeguards wellbeing; (iii) a threshold for what is acceptable; (iv) constraints on what improvements are unacceptable; and (v) demarcating what is not morally wrong, because of a lack of human agency. It then suggests an approach to evaluating animals’ behaviour that is quantitative, is based on reality, and which assesses naturalness by degrees. It proposes classing unaffected wild populations as natural by definition. Where animals might have been affected by humans, they should be compared to the closest population(s) of unaffected animals. This approach could allow us both to assess naturalness scientifically, and to make practical decisions about the behaviour of domestic animals.

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Section: Defining Animal Welfare and Natural Behaviourmentioning

confidence: 99%

Naturalness and Animal Welfare

Yeates

2018

Animals

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“…8 Lisbeth Nielsen conveniently lays out three different notions of nature that appear in the debate: (1) an overall state of things, which might be dubbed 'mother nature'; (2) the essence of a thing, in particular the essence of human beings; and 3what is free of human intervention, that is, nature as opposed to what is artificial. 9 The moral implications of the first meaning ('mother nature') fall outside our concerns here. Likewise, the third meaning has no bearing on our concerns: the use of artifice or technology, just considered in itself, has no moral implications.…”

Section: Natural and Unnaturalmentioning

confidence: 94%

Unnatural Enhancements

Jensen

Widow

2018

Irish Theological Quarterly

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This paper claims that the distinction between therapy and enhancement, which has played a significant role in the discussion of the moral implications of human enhancements, is of only secondary and subordinate importance. Of much greater importance is the distinction between natural and unnatural enhancements, or rather between natural and unnatural means of enhancing. After briefly indicating the moral significance of the distinction between what is natural and unnatural, the paper focuses on the difficult task of discriminating between those means of enhancing that are natural and those that are unnatural.

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“…We believe that this is a more problematic proposal, given the difficulties associated with these notions (Nielsen 2011), and it is not entirely clear what Cohen has in mind when he writes about the ''package [of features] that makes human beings the particular valuable creatures that we personally cherish''. However, that is not to say that this objection is completely lacking in content.…”

Section: Non-radical Enhancements-changes That Preserve Essential Feamentioning

confidence: 99%

Cohen’s Conservatism and Human Enhancement

2013

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In an intriguing essay, G. A. Cohen has defended a conservative bias in favour of existing value. In this paper, we consider whether Cohen's conservatism raises a new challenge to the use of human enhancement technologies. We develop some of Cohen's suggestive remarks into a new line of argument against human enhancement that, we believe, is in several ways superior to existing objections. However, we shall argue that on closer inspection, Cohen's conservatism fails to offer grounds for a strong sweeping objection to enhancement, and may even offer positive support for forms of enhancement that preserve valuable features of human beings. Nevertheless, we concede that Cohen's arguments may suggest some plausible and important constraints on the modality of legitimate and desirable enhancements.

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The Concept of Nature and the Enhancement Technologies Debate

Cited by 39 publications

References 7 publications

Naturalness and Animal Welfare

Naturalness and Animal Welfare

Unnatural Enhancements

Cohen’s Conservatism and Human Enhancement

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