The Conceptual Format Debate and the Challenge from (Global) Supramodality

Calzavarini, Fabrizio

doi:10.1086/717564

Cited by 5 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 97 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…According to what I will henceforth call the Grounded Cognition Model (GCM), the concrete features of concepts (e.g., the shape, motion, sound, and manipulation features of the concept encoded by the word scissors) are stored directly within modal brain systems for perception and action, such that a considerable amount of conceptual processing involves retrieving some of the same modality‐specific representations that are evoked when the relevant kinds of objects and events experienced and categorized. This view has received substantial support (Barsalou, 2016; Borghesani & Piazza, 2017; Conca & Tettamanti, 2018; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Hauk, 2016; Hauk & Tschentscher, 2013; Kemmerer, 2015a, 2015c, 2019a, 2022; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; Martin, 2016; Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2012; Pulvermüller, 2013, 2018), but it also faces many challenges (Calzavarini, in press; Morey, Kaschak, & Díez‐Álamo, 2022; Ostarek & Bottini, 2021; Ostarek & Huettig, 2019; Zwaan, 2021).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Grounded Cognition Entails Linguistic Relativity: A Neglected Implication of a Major Semantic Theory

Kemmerer

2022

Topics in Cognitive Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

According to the popular Grounded Cognition Model (GCM), the sensory and motor features of concepts, including word meanings, are stored directly within neural systems for perception and action. More precisely, the core claim is that these concrete conceptual features reuse some of the same modality‐specific representations that serve to categorize experiences involving the relevant kinds of objects and events. Research in semantic typology, however, has shown that word meanings vary significantly across the roughly 6500 languages in the world. I argue that this crosslinguistic semantic diversity has significant yet previously unrecognized theoretical consequences for the GCM. In particular, to accommodate the typological data, the GCM must assume that the concrete features of word meanings are not merely stored within sensory/motor brain systems, but are represented there in ways that are, to a nontrivial degree, language‐specific. Moreover, it must assume that these conceptual representations are also activated during the nonlinguistic processing of the relevant kinds of objects and events (e.g., during visual perception and action planning); otherwise, they would not really be grounded, which is to say, embedded inside sensory/motor systems. Crucially, however, such activations would constitute what is traditionally called linguistic relativity—that is, the influence of language‐specific semantic structures on other forms of cognition. The overarching aim of this paper is to elaborate this argument more fully and explore its repercussions. To that end, I discuss in greater detail the key aspects of the GCM, the evidence for crosslinguistic semantic diversity, pertinent work on linguistic relativity, the central claim that the GCM entails linguistic relativity, some initial supporting results, and some important limitations and future directions.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Grounded Cognition Entails Linguistic Relativity: A Neglected Implication of a Major Semantic Theory

Kemmerer

2022

Topics in Cognitive Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…However, simulations can equally involve amodal representations. My hypothesis is neutral between so-called ‘grounded’ and amodal theories of concept-driven simulation [ 1 ]. I am understanding simulation broadly so as to cover, as well as imagination and prospection, model-based suppositional thinking: deploying a model of the environment offline so as to consider what would happen in various hypothetical scenarios.…”

Section: Types Of Information Connected To a Conceptmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I am understanding simulation broadly so as to cover, as well as imagination and prospection, model-based suppositional thinking: deploying a model of the environment offline so as to consider what would happen in various hypothetical scenarios. 3 The domain-specific or task-specific representations involved in suppositional scenarios can be amodal [ 1 , 20 , 48 ]. Where modal representations are relied on, these need not be as detailed as perceptual experiences (representations driven by current input).…”

Section: Types Of Information Connected To a Conceptmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Their subject matter encompasses the concrete and abstract, particulars and properties, the physical, logical and socio-cultural, and runs from the mundane to the extraordinary: DOG, NUMBER, HEAVY, AND, MONDAY, BUS, MANDELA. 1 They are sub-propositional: a concept does not make a claim about the world on its own, but only when combined with other concepts into a complete thought. Here, only when a representation can figure as a sub-propositional recombinable component of deliberate, conscious thought 2 will it count as a concept.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Special-purpose systems need not be modality-specific (visual, auditory, motoric, etc.). Information about a specific domain may be encoded in amodal structures [ 1 , 20 ]. The cognitive map of the spatial environment, encoded in the medial temporal lobe, is a prominent example [ 21 , 22 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Concepts as plug & play devices

Shea

2022

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Research on concepts has focused on categorization. Categorization starts with a stimulus. Equally important are episodes that start with a thought. We engage in thinking to draw out new consequences from stored information, or to work out how to act. Each of the concepts out of which thought is constructed provides access to a large body of stored information. Access is not always just a matter of retrieving a stored belief (semantic memory). Often it depends on running a simulation. Simulation allows conceptual thought to draw on information in special-purpose systems, information stored in special-purpose computational dispositions and special-purpose representational structures. While the utility of simulation, prospection or imagination is widely appreciated, the role of concepts in the process is not well understood. This paper turns to cognitive and computational neuroscience for a model of how simulations enable thinkers to reach novel conclusions. Carried over to conceptual thought, the model suggests that concepts are ‘plug & play’ devices. The distinctive power of thought-driven simulation derives from the ability of concepts to plug into two kinds of structure at once: the combinatorial structure of a thought at one end and special-purpose structural representations at the other. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences’.

show abstract

Rethinking modality-specificity in the cognitive neuroscience of concrete word meaning: a position paper

Calzavarini

2023

Language, Cognition and Neuroscience

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Conceptual Format Debate and the Challenge from (Global) Supramodality

Cited by 5 publications

References 97 publications

Grounded Cognition Entails Linguistic Relativity: A Neglected Implication of a Major Semantic Theory

Grounded Cognition Entails Linguistic Relativity: A Neglected Implication of a Major Semantic Theory

Concepts as plug & play devices

Rethinking modality-specificity in the cognitive neuroscience of concrete word meaning: a position paper

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About