2005
DOI: 10.1007/11535218_7
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

The Conditional Correlation Attack: A Practical Attack on Bluetooth Encryption

Abstract: Abstract. Motivated by the security of the nonlinear filter generator, the concept of correlation was previously extended to the conditional correlation, that studied the linear correlation of the inputs conditioned on a given (short) output pattern of some specific nonlinear function. Based on the conditional correlations, conditional correlation attacks were shown to be successful and efficient against the nonlinear filter generator. In this paper, we further generalize the concept of conditional correlation… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
2
1

Citation Types

0
31
0

Year Published

2006
2006
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
3
3
2

Relationship

3
5

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 62 publications
(31 citation statements)
references
References 28 publications
0
31
0
Order By: Relevance
“…But it became a significant problem when it was incorporated into mobile devices [10][11][12][13][14][15]. Some of the recent and significant incidents about the security issues are enlisted below:…”
Section: Bluetooth Network Vulnerabilitiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…But it became a significant problem when it was incorporated into mobile devices [10][11][12][13][14][15]. Some of the recent and significant incidents about the security issues are enlisted below:…”
Section: Bluetooth Network Vulnerabilitiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For the minimum number of 132 available keystream bits the attack needs 2 84 polynomial time operations. The best currently known longkeystream attacks against E 0 are algebraic attacks [1] and correlation attacks [12,11]. These attacks all need a large amount of keystream (2 28 to 2 39 in the case of correlation attacks), and even in terms of time and memory requirements, [11] is the only feasible attack among them.…”
Section: Applicationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For each r ∈ {0, 1, 2}, a register cell q N r , N r ∈ { nr 2 − 1, nr 2 }, is selected in LFSR R r as input for the clock control. The GSM standard uses the parameters (n 0 , n 1 , n 2 ) = (19,22,23) and (N 0 , N 1 , N 2 ) = (11,12,13).…”
Section: Applicationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Considering a maximal keystream length of 2745 bits for E0 used in Bluetooth, the attack is impractical. Nonetheless, the resynchronization flaw of E0 (see [34]) enables us to deduce non-trivial correlations of full E0 from those of the core E0; this finally leads to the fastest (and only) practical known-plaintext attack on full E0 in 2005 (see [33]). …”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%