The Consciousness Paradox

Gennaro, Rocco J.

doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262016605.001.0001

Cited by 43 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…A key criticism of HOT is that it relies on the existence of a relation between the higher-order state and the state which it represents (121). That is, the first-order state is said to be transformed into a phenomenally conscious state by virtue of it being represented by the higher-order state (92,122,123). This is depicted in Fig.…”

Section: A Modified Higher-order Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

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A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

LeDoux

Brown

2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

469

417

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Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. In this view, what differs in emotional and nonemotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness.uch progress has been made in conceptualizing consciousness in recent years. This work has focused on the question of how we come to be aware of our sensory world, and has suggested that perceptual consciousness emerges via cognitive processing in cortical circuits that assemble conscious experiences in real-time. Emotional states of consciousness, on the other hand, have traditionally been viewed as involving innately programmed experiences that arise from subcortical circuits.Our thesis is that the brain mechanisms that give rise to conscious emotional feelings are not fundamentally different from those that give rise to perceptual conscious experiences. Both, we propose, involve higher-order representations (HORs) of lowerorder information by cortically based general networks of cognition (GNC). Thus, subcortical circuits are not responsible for feelings, but instead provide lower-order, nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences by cortical circuits (the distinction between cortical and subcortical circuits is defined in SI Appendix, Box 1). Our theory goes beyond traditional higher-order theory (HOT), arguing that self-centered higherorder states are essential for emotional experiences.Emotion, Consciousness, and the Brain Detailed understanding of the emotional brain, and theorizing about it, is largely based on studies that fall under the heading of "fear." We will therefore focus on this body of work in discussing emotional consciousness. In light of this approach, we define "fear" as the conscious feeling one has when in danger. Although our conclusions may not apply equally well to all emotions, we maintain that the lessons from fear provide general principles that can at least be used as a starting point for theorizing about many emotions.The Amygdala Fear Circuit View. Emotions like fear are often said to have been inherited from animal ancestors (1-6). These "basic emotions" are typically proposed to be wired into the brain's limbic system (7). Although the limbic sy...

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Section: A Modified Higher-order Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In traditional HOT (90,122,131,132), the content of the HOR is talked about as "I thoughts" (133) and is postulated to have something like the content "I am in state x." For example, if one were consciously seeing red then the higher-order state would have the content "I am seeing red."…”

Section: A Modified Higher-order Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

LeDoux

Brown

2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

469

417

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“…That would give us a large composite brain state for the completed QHOT, but still some way short of the global brain states Van Gulick entertains. However see Gennaro (2012) ch. 9 for interesting critique of Lau's model of HOT implementation.…”

Section: Quotational Higher-order Thought Theory 2721mentioning

confidence: 99%

Quotational higher-order thought theory

Coleman

2015

Philos Stud

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Due to their reliance on constitutive higher-order representing to generate the qualities of which the subject is consciously aware, I argue that the major existing higher-order representational theories of consciousness insulate us from our first-order sensory states. In fact on these views we are never properly conscious of our sensory states at all. In their place I offer a new higher-order theory of consciousness, with a view to making us suitably intimate with our sensory states in experience. This theory relies on the idea of 'quoting' sensory qualities, so is dubbed the 'quotational higher-order thought theory'. I argue that it can capture something of the idea that we are 'acquainted' with our conscious states without slipping beyond the pale for naturalists, whilst also providing satisfying treatments of traditional problems for higher-order theories concerning representational mismatch. The theory achieves this by abandoning a representational mechanism for mental intentionality, in favour of one based on 'embedding'.Keywords Consciousness Á Higher-order thought Á Qualia Á Representation Á Self-representation Á Acquaintance For those who believe consciousness requires higher-order cognitive access to a mental state, 1 two major questions concern, respectively, the relationship between the accessing and accessed vehicles, and that between the accessing and accessed S. Coleman (&) Department of Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, de Havilland Campus, Hatfield, Hertfordshire AL10 9AB, UK e-mail: S.Coleman@herts.ac.uk 1 Cf. Gennaro (2012: 282). This mental operation on a mental state distinguishes 'higher-order' theories of consciousness from 'first-order' ones (Tye 2000; Dretske 1995) where a mental state is conscious due to its functional role, e.g. being poised to impact beliefs and desires. 123PhilosStud (2015) 172:2705-2733 DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0441-1 contents.2 Concerning the vehicles, especially interesting is the question how tightly bound the accessed state is with the accessing state. Is the accessed mental state wholly distinct from the accessing mental state, wholly identical to it, or somewhere in between (and if the latter, where exactly in between)? Concerning the contents, especially interesting is the question whether the accessing or accessed content dominates in fixing what the subject finds in consciousness.The literature on higher-order approaches to consciousness features a superficial variety of positions on the vehicle issue, and an unacknowledged consensus on the content issue. This paper adopts novel positions on both issues, yielding a new higher-order theory of consciousness. Our dialectic springs from the problem of mistargeted representations. We see how this problem has generated consensus on the content issue, how this consensus makes the variety of responses to the vehicle issue superficial, and how this convergence is evitable by a different treatment of the difficulty. This leads to a higherorder theory whose distinctive feature, as well as dealing neatly ...

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“…Gennaro () too has argued that phenomenal character is exhausted by conceptual content, and he explicitly develops a defense of conceptualism.…”

Section: The Argument From Fogmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Rosenthal (, , ) maintains that the transitivity principle is the best way to capture our commonsense understanding of mental state consciousness. Gennaro argues that it's a conceptual truth (, p. 28). Lycan () offers the principle as a stipulative definition that corresponds to at least one commonsense notion of ‘consciousness’.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Keeping it Real: Intentional Inexistents, Fineness‐of‐Grain, and the Dilemma for Extrinsic Higher‐Order Representational Theories

Picciuto

2015

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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According to the standard argument from targetless higher-order representations, the possibility of such representations presents a dilemma for higher-order theorists. In this article I argue that there are two theoretically well-motivated replies to the standard argument. Consequently, the standard argument against higher-order theories fails. I then go on to argue that while certain versions of higher-order theory can adequately respond to the standard argument, they both, nevertheless, fail to explain the fineness-of-grain that phenomenally conscious experience appears to have.

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The Consciousness Paradox

Cited by 43 publications

References 4 publications

A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

Quotational higher-order thought theory

Keeping it Real: Intentional Inexistents, Fineness‐of‐Grain, and the Dilemma for Extrinsic Higher‐Order Representational Theories

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