The Constitution of Myanmar

Ruling but not Governing: Tutelary Regimes and the Case of Myanmar

“…It has fought more than a dozen ethnic rebellions in the periphery since the 1960s and has been the most powerful actor in the country since that time. Given its deep penetration of the regime, the economy and the society, the Tatmadaw has even been referred to as the state (Crouch 2019). With the aim of enhancing regime stability and gaining international legitimacy, the military junta (State Peace and Development Council, SPDC) initiated a series of reforms in the early 2000s which established the tutelary regime's foundation.…”

“…At the regime's core lies the 2008 constitution, which contains many liberal and illiberal elements and established a power-sharing arrangement between civilian and military actors. It secured the military's role in the national leadership of the state: the military undertakes both legislative and executive tasks and is the guardian of the constitution, technically overseeing the political system (Crouch 2019: 12). Additionally, it created a ‘coercive centralism’ (Crouch 2019: 13) – a centralistic polity with limited devolution of power to subnational or regional entities – and placed most appointment processes and lines of accountability at the level of central government.…”

“…It secured the military's role in the national leadership of the state: the military undertakes both legislative and executive tasks and is the guardian of the constitution, technically overseeing the political system (Crouch 2019: 12). Additionally, it created a ‘coercive centralism’ (Crouch 2019: 13) – a centralistic polity with limited devolution of power to subnational or regional entities – and placed most appointment processes and lines of accountability at the level of central government. As such, the 2008 constitution represented a ‘survival strategy’ on the part of the military regime to overcome the dangers of factionalism and instability (Croissant and Kamerling 2014), an ‘insurance policy’ for the military elite to foresee loss of power (David and Holliday 2018: 52) and a ‘key part of the establishment and maintenance of the military state’ (Crouch 2019: 3).…”

“…Additionally, it created a ‘coercive centralism’ (Crouch 2019: 13) – a centralistic polity with limited devolution of power to subnational or regional entities – and placed most appointment processes and lines of accountability at the level of central government. As such, the 2008 constitution represented a ‘survival strategy’ on the part of the military regime to overcome the dangers of factionalism and instability (Croissant and Kamerling 2014), an ‘insurance policy’ for the military elite to foresee loss of power (David and Holliday 2018: 52) and a ‘key part of the establishment and maintenance of the military state’ (Crouch 2019: 3). It established the preconditions for and delineated the boundary of the political liberalization that followed under President Thein Sein (2011–15) and the current National League for Democracy (NLD) government (since 2016) (Bünte 2016).…”

“…The commander-in-chief has full control over all aspects of the internal administration of the army. Legally, he is appointed by the president with the approval of the Defence Council, though he is not subordinate to the executive branch (Crouch 2019: 41). The lack of civilian control can be illustrated by the discussion about the tenure of current commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing: appointed in 2011 by outgoing junta strongman Senior General Than Shwe, he was about to reach the mandatory retirement age (of 60) in 2015.…”