The Contestation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime

Abstract

The nuclear world order, and more specifically the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), represent since their very creation objects of contestation. This chapter argues that it is the institutionalized power inequality between state parties that creates conflict among them over the distribution of security, economic, and developmental benefits. In that respect, states with growing economic importance and heightened security interests are most likely to contest the status quo, but not necessarily the BRICS states as these are not bound by a common interest or agenda within the regime. To analyse the contestation of the NPT, the chapter adopts a mixed method approach. Through a qualitative content analysis of states’ statements at major institutional gatherings, the chapter identifies four central conflict lines and actors’ preferences regarding the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Linear regression analysis is used to assess the relative influence of different actors groups on the intensity and type of contestation. Results show that the majority of state parties actively and constructively engages with the institution by pushing for institutional reform, recognizing in principle the legitimacy of the institution. Voicing criticism and exposing weaknesses of the institution was the least frequent form of contestation.

Crisis in arms control: an introduction

“…It makes it untimely because none of the authors were able to explore the implications that this unprovoked aggression might have for international arms control and disarmament efforts. Yet, it makes this Special Issue timely because German peace and conflict researchers, in particular, had been warning us for years that the crisis of arms control is not just another sign of deteriorating great power relations but contributes directly to diminished global security and stability (Kühn 2020 ; Pieper 2020 ; Wisotzki 2020 ; Müller and Tokhi 2019 ).…”

Greasing the Wheels of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: The Political Economy of Nuclear Suppliers Group Rules

“…However, it also helps with at least two of the aforementioned challenges. First, it mitigates some of the distributional issues inherent in the regime (Müller and Tokhi 2019). Nonproliferation is inherently discriminatory (Nye 1981, 22), and in one light the NSG's cartel structure reinforces the divisions between the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the "have nots" (the non-nuclear weapon states, "NNWS") in the broader regime, even if on paper the division in the NSG is between nuclear suppliers and nuclear importers.…”