The Contextual Determinants of Support for Unilateral Action

Reeves, Andrew; Rogowski, Jon C.; Seo, Min Hee; Stone, Andrew

doi:10.1111/psq.12391

Cited by 14 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…Still, the results show that bias against unilateral action in the form of a veto is far from uniform. Instead, support for a veto is highly conditioned by political views and circumstances, a finding that comports better with the results of some recent experiments about presidents’ use of unilateral action (Reeves and Rogowski ; ; Christenson and Kriner ) than others (Reeves et al ). In addition, we find little evidence that this bias against unilateral action inhibits presidents from following through on threats with acts.…”

Section: Conclusion: How the Public Chooses Sidessupporting

confidence: 66%

Presidents’ Vetoes and Audience Costs

Rice¹,

Kernell²

2018

Pres Stud Q

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Veto threats may offer presidents bargaining leverage, but such leverage will be diminished if they and those with whom they transact business view a veto as hurting the president’s approval rating and his party’s prospects in the next election. How concerned must presidents be about the audience costs associated with a veto? Political science research suggests that they should be in that the public does not like vetoes and punishes presidents when they exercise this authority. In this article, we test this argument with survey responses during times after presidents have issued a veto threat but before an actual veto. While, on average, respondents register opposition to a veto, this preference varies greatly with the specific policy in question and with respondents’ party identification and presidential approval. The results suggest that opposition to a veto comes disproportionately, may be limited to politically distant respondents, and thus may not be as costly as the net negative numbers suggest.

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Section: Conclusion: How the Public Chooses Sidessupporting

confidence: 66%

Presidents’ Vetoes and Audience Costs

Rice¹,

Kernell²

2018

Pres Stud Q

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show abstract

“…Second, there is a general agreement that policy considerations shape evaluations. All else being equal, the public is more supportive of presidential power when they agree with the direction of the policy change (Christenson and Kriner 2017a ;Reeves and Rogowski 2016) or when they are told that a majority of the public supports the president's position (Reeves et. al.…”

Section: Public Attitudes Toward Presidential Powersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, there is general agreement that partisanship is a key determinant of evaluations of presidential powers Kriner 2017a, Reeves andRogowski 2015;Reeves et. al.…”

Section: Public Attitudes Toward Presidential Powersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Namely, it was a period of divided government with Republicans controlling both chambers of Congress and a Democratic President, Barack Obama, serving in the White House. Since partisanship is expected to influence attitudes toward presidential powers Kriner 2017a, Reeves andRogowski 2015;Reeves et. al.…”

Section: Public Attitudes Toward Veto Powersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In their discussion of political constraints on presidential actions, Christenson and Kriner (2015) note that public opinion has not been directly incorporated into scholarship on the use of and constraints on presidential power. Presidential scholars have begun to correct this oversight with a growing body of scholarship that explores the public's attitudes toward presidential power Kriner 2017a, 2017b;Lowande and Gray 2017;Rogowski 2015, 2017;Reeves et. al.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Public attitudes toward presidential veto powers

Sievert

Williamson

2018

Research & Politics

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Previous research on presidential powers has demonstrated predictable variation in the level of support for presidential usage of those powers. However, much of this work has focused solely on unilateral powers. Here, we seek to further explore public attitudes towards constitutionally prescribed powers-namely that of the executive veto. Using original survey data, we find that public support of the president's use of the veto is dependent on respondent partisanship as well as approval of both the president and Congress. Overall, our findings provide some support for previous research on the topic, but also offer new insights. First, we find a higher baseline level of support for presidential powers. Second, our results indicate that the president's copartisans are more supportive of the veto even after controlling for presidential and congressional approval.

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Partisan Context and Procedural Values: Attitudes Towards Presidential Secrecy Before and after the 2016 US Election

Berliner

2020

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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What shapes attitudes towards procedural rules that constrain executive power? This letter argues that procedural values are contextual: A function of who is in power. Supporters of those in power prefer fewer procedural constraints, while opposition supporters prefer greater. This study reports the results of a unique test using data from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey. Respondents were asked, in both pre- and post-election waves, if they thought it should be ‘easier or harder for the president to keep documents secret from the public’. The panel design makes it possible to track individual changes following the shift in political context. The results show evidence of a partisan ‘flip’ in attitudes following the election, with Republicans becoming less likely – and Democrats more likely – to prefer additional constraints on presidential secrecy. However, this partisan ‘flip’ is present only among higher political knowledge respondents.

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The Contextual Determinants of Support for Unilateral Action

Cited by 14 publications

References 49 publications

Presidents’ Vetoes and Audience Costs

Presidents’ Vetoes and Audience Costs

Public attitudes toward presidential veto powers

Partisan Context and Procedural Values: Attitudes Towards Presidential Secrecy Before and after the 2016 US Election

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