The Cooperative Resolution of Policy Conflict

Quirk, Paul J.

doi:10.2307/1962066

Cited by 33 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Consequently, regulated firms should favor cooperative enforcement even while seeking the lowest possible level of enforcement activity. The occupational safety and health policy arena possesses several traits that Quirk (1989) argues should promote such cooperation-mutual gains from cooperation for the two primary well-organized factions: business and labor.…”

Section: Political Interests and Cooperative Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness

1991

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Even when political interests control bureaucratic outputs, the control of policy outcomes is complicated by trade-offs between controllable versus effective implementation strategies. I use a nested game framework to explain why a cooperative strategy can increase enforcement effectiveness in the narrow administrative game and why principal-agent control problems and collective action problems associated with the strategy lead policy beneficiaries to oppose the effective strategy in the broader political games. Analyses of state-level Occupational Safety and Health Administration enforcement provide evidence that cooperation does enhance the impact of enforcement in reducing workplace injury rates but that policy beneficiaries oppose and sabotage cooperation. The interactions between administrative effectiveness and interest group politics in this and other implementation situations require that both be analyzed simultaneously, and the nested game framework can provide a systematic approach to such analyses.

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Section: Political Interests and Cooperative Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness

1991

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“…The worst situation in gametheoretical terms would be that individuals would prefer defection as a dominant strategy even if they acknowledged that this would lead to the total ruination of their common resource and thus reduce their options. Quirk described this strategy as a "deadlock", which "leads to a conflict as a stable outcome" (Quirk 1989).…”

Section: Social Dilemmas In Managing Natural Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflict management as a means to the sustainable use of natural resources

Kyllönen¹,

Colpaert²,

Heikkinen³

et al. 2006

Silva Fenn.

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. Conflict management as a means to the sustainable use of natural resources. Silva Fennica 40(4): 687-728.Democratic societies' emphasis on individual rights and freedoms inevitably opens them up to political disputes. Conflict management should thus be seen as an integral part of democratic institutional design. The evolution and management of policy disputes concerning the use of different natural resources in Finland is analysed by using the theoretical models of frame analysis and strategic interaction. The studied disputes include lake fisheries, watercourse regulation, reindeer herding, and forestry. The institutional design in the case studies varies. Despite the differences, many common features are identified that could explain their successes or difficulties in achieving sustainable and cooperative use of the resources. Among these are problems involving complex and uncertain knowledge, differences in frames held by multiple users of a resource, and distrust between the users and other parties. The analysis concludes with preliminary conclusions on how various disputes related to sustainable resource use could be managed. These include addressing the knowledge and frame problems in order to initiate a learning process; establishing sub-processes in which mutual trust between the parties -including a managing authority or a third party -can emerge; giving explicit roles and a clear division of entitlement to the parties; and providing a credible alternative for co-operation that affects the parties' payoff assessments during the process. Finally, the conflict management process shouldn't be regarded as a distinct phase of dispute resolution, but as an essential aspect of ongoing co-management practices of resource use.

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“…The costs to consumers entailed 10. Outcomes in which opposing sides are able to realize joint gains from compromise are discussed in Quirk [1989] and Perotti [1990].…”

Section: Pharmaceutical Regulatory Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Influence and Regulatory Policy: The 1984 Drug Legislation

Olson

1994

Economic Inquiry

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This paper applies a positive theory of legislation to explain the development of the 1984 Drug Price Competition Act and the Patent Term Restoration Act. Specifically, it examines why regulatory reforms prior to 1984 were stalemated, and why the 1984 legislation was enacted. Results show that prior to 1984, members of the key congressional committees had preferences in which the proposed bills could not beat the status quo. However, changes in subcommittee membership in the House combined with a change in the majority party in the Senate created a situation in which the 1984 legislation could defeat the status quo.

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The Cooperative Resolution of Policy Conflict

Cited by 33 publications

References 21 publications

Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness

Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness

Conflict management as a means to the sustainable use of natural resources

Political Influence and Regulatory Policy: The 1984 Drug Legislation

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