The Cost of Multiple Large Shareholders

Abstract

Previous research argues that large non-controlling shareholders enhance firm value because they deter expropriation by the controlling shareholder. We propose that the conflicting incentives faced by large shareholders may induce a nonlinear relationship between the relative size of large shareholdings and firm value. Consistent with this prediction, we present evidence that there are costs of having a second (and third) largest shareholder, especially when the largest shareholdings are similar in size. Our results are robust to various relative size proxies, firm performance measures, model specifications, and potential endogeneity issues. JEL classification: G32; G34.We would like to thank the Centre for Advanced Studies in Finance, University of Leeds, for its financial support. We are grateful to

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