The crowding-out effect of shareholder value-based CEO compensation on R&D investment in the European context: a new interpretation

Abstract

PurposeIn the present study, using a novel fractional logit model, the link between R&D (Research & Development) investment and shareholder value-based CEO (Chief Executive Officer) compensation has been examined within the non-financial sector in the Euro area economies using a firm-level dataset for 2002–2019.Design/methodology/approachThe fractional logit model is utilized to examine the effects of corporate payment on R&D investment. The fractional logit model can be considered the empirical approach that takes into account R&D non-performer firms to avoid reducing the sample size. The fractional logit model is superior to the censored or truncated models, like Tobit, since the fractional logit model is useful to address the econometric limitations that are found in the censored and truncated models in the non-linear models.FindingsThe findings obtained in this study showed a significant and negative effect of short-term aim-based CEO payment on R&D expenditures in the Euro area economies using firm-level data. These findings are robust to different robustness checks and modeling alternatives.Originality/valueTo the author's knowledge, there is no study that examines the effects of short-term shareholder value maximization-based CEO compensation on R&D in the European context in the literature.