The Cultivation of Genetically Modified Organisms in the European Union: A Necessary Trade‐Off?

Abstract

This article analyzes the reasons why in 2010 the European Commission proposed a legislative framework on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) that could give some powers back to the Member States. This legislative proposal is puzzling since it moves the centre of decision‐making regarding the cultivation of GMOs from the EU level back to the domestic level and it also contradicts the generally acknowledged behaviour of the Commission as a competence maximizer. Using a multilevel governance perspective and based on an extensive literature review and semi‐structured interviews, the article examines the dynamics and relationships between the various levels of governance that generated pressures on the Commission to issue this counterintuitive proposal. The findings suggest that the Commission is making a (necessary) trade‐off between, on the one hand, the respect of international obligations and the preservation of the internal market, and on the other hand, internal pressures towards stricter regulation of GMOs.

Responsiveness to Different National Interests: Voting Behaviour on Genetically Modified Organisms in the Council of the European Union

“…Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) represent a highly politicized issue in the European Union (EU), and one on which the Member States are deeply divided. Therefore, for the last two decades, there has been a gridlock in the Council of Ministers regarding the authorization of GMOs, with Member States failing to reach a qualified majority in favour or against the authorization requests (Herring and Paarlberg, ; Kurzer and Cooper, ; Navah et al, ; Randour et al, ; Skogstad, ; Smart et al, ). What makes this situation particularly interesting is that the high level of dissent has actually led to the approval of GMOs by the European Commission due to the specific rules of the authorization procedure (Dobbs, ).…”

“…What makes this situation particularly interesting is that the high level of dissent has actually led to the approval of GMOs by the European Commission due to the specific rules of the authorization procedure (Dobbs, ). According to the comitology procedure that applies here (see Randour et al, , p. 1311), with such ‘no‐opinion’ scenarios in the Council, ‘the responsibility to take a final decision falls upon the Commission, obliging a decision to be taken without clear political backing from member states’ (European Commission, ). While GMOs are a particularly prominent case and account for the greatest share of no‐opinion scenarios, there are also other examples, such as the decision on whether or not to ban the use of the substance glyphosate in herbicides (see Redbond, ).…”

Attaining Subsidiarity-Based Multilevel Governance of Genetically Modified Cultivation?

“…However, they would also significantly alter the current approach, lead to some deharmonisation and likely prove problematic and contentious -with external and internal pressures making such changes unlikely. 107 This is highlighted by the 2010 Cultivation Package and Directive 2015/412, which repeatedly confirm that environmental and health aspects are to remain harmonised, 108 despite the deharmonisation of other aspects.…”

Implementing an EU opt‐in mechanism for GM crop cultivation

“…However, the political reality justifies unorthodox solutions. In addition, the opt-out mechanism introduced by Directive 2015/412 has been characterised as very atypical in terms of the EU internal market policy [6,7]. As the current implementation of the EU legislation arguably does not fulfil the criteria of legal certainty, non-discrimination and scientific adaptability [8], we suggest that the proposed opt-in mechanism would provide a more balanced regulatory setting, particularly as it would facilitate science-based considerations for implementation.…”