The Day After: What to Expect in post-Islamic State Mosul

Playing with Fire: An Assessment of the EU’s Approach of Constructive Ambiguity on Kosovo’s Blended Conflict

“…It is a deep-rooted sectarian conflict among Sunnis and Shi'as and an ethnic conflict primarily between Arabs and Kurds, but also other ethnic groups as well, such as Turkmens. 24 It was, until the defeat of the Islamic State in 2017, a conflict between three de facto states: the Kurdistan Region, the Islamic State and the Baghdad-Basra region controlled by the government of Iraq. 25 It is also a civil conflict between Kurds themselves produced and sustained through the division between the dominant political parties (Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan), their respective armies and their international supporters.…”

Tales of pleasures of violence and combat resilience among Iraqi Shi’i combatants fighting ISIS

“…However, most of the current research and ponderings on Hashd treat it as a single entity influenced by Shi’i notions and Shi’i combatants, without considering the intriguing peculiarities of Hashd, which now has more than 100,000 combatants. When speculating on the fate of post-ISIS Mosul, Abdulrazaq and Stansfield (2016) speak of Hashd and the fear of what its Shi’i combatants will bring to the Sunnis in Mosul. They speak of the fear that has been deeply rooted in the sectarian divide between Shi’i and Sunni ever since these Islamic sects were founded following the death of Muhammad, the prophet of Islam.…”

“…They speak of the fear that has been deeply rooted in the sectarian divide between Shi’i and Sunni ever since these Islamic sects were founded following the death of Muhammad, the prophet of Islam. Abdulrazaq and Stansfield (2016) posit that there will be further upheaval and the possible re-emergence of a new version of Islamic fundamentalism after ISIS, and that Hashd may accelerate that re-emergence. However, they do not believe that Hashd can be regarded as a monolithic Shi’i entity, despite its ‘heavily documented’ (Abdulrazaq and Stansfield, 2016: 17) mistreatment of Sunnis.…”

Liberating Mosul: Beyond the Battle

“…One is to counteract the effect of Kirkuk's joining the KRI, as the city's majority adhere to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). 34 Additionally, the current political crisis in the KRI heightens the need for the KDP to gain more territory under its sphere of influence in order to boost its hand in future negotiations with the PUK and Gorran. These factors increase the possibility of the KRG's taking the disputed territories through force.…”