“…its power to capture, amaze, and stupefy” (Sherwin 2011, p. 106). Stupefaction is part of its appeal; it opposes thought, and the hatred of thinking is, phenomenologically speaking, what contemporary Kleinians mean by the death drive (Bell 2015). It is hard to argue with the observation that alongside the pleasure in destructiveness, we see a “continuous pull towards a pleasurable mindlessness” (Bell 2015, p. 421).…”
Section: The Digital Reality Principle: the Homogenization Of Experiencementioning
Kierkegaard's concept of leveling is applied to the dynamics of envy, particularly as they come into play among psychoanalysts doing clinical analytic work. This is illustrated in two clinical vignettes. The technocultural surround of the digital age impinges on analytic identity in ways that can evoke fantasied retreats into sameness and erasure of distinction. The "digital reality principle" is introduced as a way of conceptualizing an aspect of the hatred of thinking and certain envious responses to distinction. Charisma is considered as a possible release from sameness and the prevalent homogenization of experience. Among analysts, an internalized leveling process can sometimes function as a bulwark of homogenization.
“…its power to capture, amaze, and stupefy” (Sherwin 2011, p. 106). Stupefaction is part of its appeal; it opposes thought, and the hatred of thinking is, phenomenologically speaking, what contemporary Kleinians mean by the death drive (Bell 2015). It is hard to argue with the observation that alongside the pleasure in destructiveness, we see a “continuous pull towards a pleasurable mindlessness” (Bell 2015, p. 421).…”
Section: The Digital Reality Principle: the Homogenization Of Experiencementioning
Kierkegaard's concept of leveling is applied to the dynamics of envy, particularly as they come into play among psychoanalysts doing clinical analytic work. This is illustrated in two clinical vignettes. The technocultural surround of the digital age impinges on analytic identity in ways that can evoke fantasied retreats into sameness and erasure of distinction. The "digital reality principle" is introduced as a way of conceptualizing an aspect of the hatred of thinking and certain envious responses to distinction. Charisma is considered as a possible release from sameness and the prevalent homogenization of experience. Among analysts, an internalized leveling process can sometimes function as a bulwark of homogenization.
“…Freud's concept of the death instinct or death drive was essentially a biological one but those who took it up and used it theoretically conceptualized its functioning in psychological terms (Bell, ; Frank, ). Segal put it most clearly when she wrote:Birth confronts us with the experience of needs.…”
Section: The Death Instinct and Klein's Views On The Superegomentioning
The first section of the paper explores a number of differing views regarding the concept of the superego, essentially in terms of its formation and its functions. Two broad theories of superego development, both of which were introduced by Freud, are described. The first takes the superego to be principally oedipal in origin; the second traces the superego to an earlier period. The controversy about the usefulness of the concept of the death instinct is also implicated in the different views. It is then suggested that it is worthwhile to distinguish between a normal superego and a pathological superego and that these two distinct models of the superego are implicit in the work of both Freud and Klein. Strachey's (1934) views on the nature of the mutative effect of psychoanalytic treatment are briefly reviewed in the light of this distinction. It is suggested that Strachey was hesitant in clarifying the full implications of his views, particularly regarding the reasons for the difficulty the psychoanalyst will experience in making a transference interpretation. It is argued that the difficulty will relate to the psychoanalyst's anxiety about having sufficiently worked through the countertransference, particularly in relation to superego functioning. Two brief clinical vignettes are considered in support of this view. The last section of the paper offers some comments on the emotional development of the psychoanalyst and the ways that maturing as a psychoanalyst will involve a certain mellowing of the analyst's stance and a greater tolerance of the patient's prerogative to bring the full range of his or her personality into the treatment.
“…Another familiar experience is the state of disintegration, when we are overwhelmed and feel that we are, as Klein calls it, “falling to pieces” ( ibid ., p. 5) or “to bits” (1946b, p. 101), which she regards as an actual state of the ego, not only a feeling or fear in relation to it. With this perspective in mind, it is interesting to note that some of the prototypical Kleinian examples of the manifestation of the death instinct describe a pull not towards death per se , but towards the dispersal of parts of one's mind, an annihilation of the capacity to perceive and experience (see Bell, ; Klein, ; Segal, ). Segal (), in fact, defines the death instinct as encountered in clinical practice as a drive to “annihilate the perceiving experiencing self” (p. 55) and the object perceived, which she adds are “hardly distinguishable from one another” (p. 56).…”
Section: How Klein's Conception Of Object Relations Grounds Her Theormentioning
confidence: 99%
“…And in his description of different phenomenological forms in which the death drive is expressed, David Bell () refers to both a state of a destruction of functions of the self and what he refers to as “a lure into mindlessness”. Such states of dismemberment or disintegration are of special interest because they come experientially close to the primary anxiety state described by Freud—the state of being overwhelmed by stimulation without there being present any coherent sense of self that could do something with this stimulation.…”
Section: How Klein's Conception Of Object Relations Grounds Her Theormentioning
It is well known that Melanie Klein held the view that 'fear of death' is the primary source of anxiety and that her position is explicitly opposed to that of Sigmund Freud, who maintained that that fear cannot in any way or form be a source of anxiety. In a previous article on Freud's Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (Blass, 2013), the author argued that, counter to what is commonly portrayed in the literature, Freud's considerations for rejecting the fear of death as a source of anxiety were based on relational and experiential factors that are usually associated with Kleinian psychoanalysis. In light of this affinity of Freud with Klein a question arises as to the actual source of their differences in this context. The present paper offers an answer to this question. The author first presents some of her earlier findings on what led Freud to reject the fear of death as a source of anxiety and then turns to investigate Klein's considerations for accepting it. This takes us beyond her explicit statements on this matter and sheds new light on the relationship of her views regarding death and anxiety and those of Freud. In turn this deepens the understanding of the relationship of Freud and Klein's conceptualizations of the psyche and its internal object relations, pointing to both surprising common ground and foundational differences.
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