The Declining Middle: Occupational Change, Social Status, and the Populist Right

Abstract

This article investigates the political consequences of occupational change in times of rapid technological advancement and sheds light on the economic and cultural roots of right-wing populism. A growing body of research shows that the disadvantages of a transforming employment structure are strongly concentrated among semiskilled routine workers in the lower middle class. I argue that individual employment trajectories and relative shifts in the social hierarchy are key to better understand recent political disruptions. A perception of relative economic decline among politically powerful groups—not their impoverishment—drives support for conservative and, especially, right-wing populist parties. Individual-level panel data from three postindustrial democracies and original survey data demonstrate this relationship. A possible interpretation of the findings is that traditional welfare policy might be an ineffective remedy against the ascent of right-wing populism.

Neither Left-Behind nor Superstar: Ordinary Winners of Digitalization at the Ballot Box

“…This is consistent with previous ndings that digitalization makes losers more likely to support antiestablishment parties (Im et al, 2019;Anelli, Colantone and Stanig, 2019;Kurer, 2020). The magnitude of the e ect is impressive but it is very imprecisely estimated.…”

Dualization and Electoral Realignment

“…Rather, it is the traditional manufacturing working class that supports these parties strongly. Several recent studies also find evidence that the actual experience of unemployment or occupational precariousness is unrelated to right-wing populist voting (Kurer 2017). All these studies come to the consistent conclusion that the right-wing populist vote is not a direct reaction to the experience of economic hardship.…”

Automation risk and support for welfare policies: how does the threat of unemployment affect demanding active labour market policy support?

“…This view leverages other studies that explore the political consequences of labour market risk based on a similar occupational approach (Rehm, 2009;Schwander & Häusermann, 2013;Thewissen & Rueda, 2017). These studies show that individuals respond to their occupational risk of unemployment, regardless of whether such risks actually materialize (Kurer, 2020).…”

“…They may find welfare competition to be more salient due to the characteristics of unemployment risk from automation. Although routine workers face a greater threat of becoming unemployed than nonroutine workers, only a fraction of them actually become unemployed thus far (Kurer, 2020;Kurer & Gallego, 2019). Furthermore, actual unemployment, should it occur, may take place in the future rather than imminently.…”

“…That is, although routine workers are more threatened by unemployment from automation, their elevated unemployment risk may not necessarily materialize into actual unemployment. Recent studies show that only a fraction of routine workers become unemployed; most manage to "survive" in their routine jobs (Kurer, 2020;Kurer & Gallego, 2019). Like other risk-based approaches, however, I contend that routine workers' elevated threat of unemployment may still give rise to significant political consequences (Rehm, 2009;Schwander & Häusermann, 2013;Thewissen & Rueda, 2017).…”