The demand for military spending in developing countries: A dynamic panel analysis∗

Dunne, J. Paul; Perlo-Freeman, Sam

doi:10.1080/1024269032000085224

Cited by 94 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 20 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Not only are autocracies more likely to experience violent uprising, they are also more incline than democracies to meet it with large-scale force, which in turn should lead to higher expenditures on the military. These ideas are supported by empirical evidence -see for example Hewitt, 1992;Dunne and Perlo-Freeman, 2003;Goldsmith, 2003;Fordham and Walker, 2005;Acemoglu et al, 2010, who find that dictatorships spend more on the military than democracies do.…”

Section: Studying Military Expenditures Is Important For Many Reasonssupporting

confidence: 55%

“…Following the literature on the determinants of military expenditures (see for example Dunne and Perlo-Freeman, 2003), we regress the log of military burden on the regime type dummies, Polity IV, internal war, external war, log GDP per capita, log population and log openness. GDP per capita is a measure of wealth, while population is a measure of size.…”

Section: Methodology and Empirical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The demand for military expenditure in authoritarian regimes

Bove

Brauner

2014

Defence and Peace Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper examines whether there are systematic differences in military spending between different types of autocratic regimes. We view military expenditure as an instrument a dictator can exploit in order to stay in power. How he utilises this instrument depends on the institutional set up of his regime. We distinguish between military regimes, single party states and personalist regimes and predict that military regimes should have the highest, whereas personalist dictatorships should have the lowest level of military spending. Using panel data on 64 dictatorships from 1960 to 2000, we find empirical evidence that our hypotheses are not rejected.

show abstract

Section: Studying Military Expenditures Is Important For Many Reasonssupporting

confidence: 55%

Section: Methodology and Empirical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The demand for military expenditure in authoritarian regimes

Bove

Brauner

2014

Defence and Peace Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…2 The international security environment, such as regional and global conflicts, an ongoing arms race and superpower alliances have been shown to matter the most (Maizels and Nissanke 1986;Looney and Frederiksen 1990;Smith 1995;Dunne and Perlo-Freeman 2003;Goldsmith 2003;Dunne et al 2008;Nordhaus et al 2012). …”

Section: Political Determinants Of Military Spendingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coups d’état and defense spending: a counterfactual analysis

Bove

Nisticò

2014

Public Choice

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We explore how institutional set-ups, in particular changes in political institutions through coups d'état , can affect the way military expenditures are determined.We use a counterfactual approach, the synthetic control method, and compare the evolution of the military burden for 40 countries affected by coups with the evolution of a synthetic counterfactual that replicates the initial conditions and the potential outcomes of the countries of interest before exposure to coups. Our case studies suggest that successful coups result in a large increase in the military burden.However, when no effects or a decrease in the defense burden are found, it is often the consequence of a democratization process triggered by the coup. These results are in keeping with recent theoretical developments on the bargaining power of the military in authoritarian regimes. Failed coups, by contrast, produce a smaller, and mostly positive, effect on the military burden, possibly as a result of the incumbent's strategy to avert further challenges to the stability of the regime by buying off the military.JEL classification: H11, H56

show abstract

“…Two types of model have been used to examine the determinants of military spending 2003a): firstly, the arms race model (Richardson, 1960), which focuses primarily on the military spending of potential enemies or allies to explain defense spending;…”

Section: Related Empirical Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The empirical literature examining these issues (Rosh, 1988;Dunne & Perlo-Freeman, 2003a, 2003b, Dunne et al, 2008Gadea et al, 2004;Yildirim, J. & S. Sezgin, 2005;Collier & Hoeffler, 2007;Nikolaidou, 2008) has shed some light on our overall understanding of military spending.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional determinants of military spending

Albalate¹,

Bel

Elias

2012

Journal of Comparative Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Drawing on a database for 1988-2006 containing information on 157 countries, we investigate the effects on military spending of government form and democracy, electoral rules and concentration of parliamentary parties. From an OLS regression on pooled data, our results show that presidential democracies spend more than parliamentary systems on defense, whereas its interaction with a majoritarian electoral rule reduces the defense burden. Our findings suggest that, in contrast to theoretical predictions in the literature, institutions do not have the same impact on the provision of all public goods.

show abstract

The demand for military spending in developing countries: A dynamic panel analysis∗

Cited by 94 publications

References 20 publications

The demand for military expenditure in authoritarian regimes

The demand for military expenditure in authoritarian regimes

Coups d’état and defense spending: a counterfactual analysis

Institutional determinants of military spending

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About