The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition

Nur Otan, Informal Networks and the Countering of Elite Instability in Kazakhstan: Bringing the ‘Formal’ Back In

“…2007ECPRAST, 2005). This characterisation of informal networks illustrates that while some of these networks are based on familial tribal kinship bonds (Khlyupin, 1998) what typifies them is their concentration around economic interests (Junisbai, 2005(Junisbai, , 2010. Dosym Satpayev, a prominent analyst in the country, has argued that 'one reason defines their behaviour, economic interests: only economic interests, no tribes, no other factors.…”

“…Consequently, some groups not connected to the president by kinship felt marginalised in the struggle for former state enterprises. The increasing influence, in particular, of Aliev and Kulibayev, saw other groups frustrated by their lack of access to new resources (Junisbai and Junisbai, 2005;Junisbai, 2010). According to one senior political figure, it was clear 'Aliev was gaining too much power and accruing too many business interests'.…”

“…10 (Chebotarev, 2006). This article is not the place to discuss indepth the events of 2001 as they have been dealt with elsewhere (Junisbai and Junisbai, 2005;11 Interview with Yevgenni Zhovtis, Director of Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law, 29 January 2007, Almaty, Kazakhstan Chebotarev, 2006).The conflict between the groups began intensifying as Aliev used his position as deputy head of the KNB (security services) to take control of some of Ablyazov's business including Turan Alem Bank while managing a portfolio of media assets such as the State TV channel Khabar and the newspaper Karavan (Junisbai and Junisbai, 2005: 380).…”

A Tale of Two Kazakhstans: Sources of Political Cleavage and Conflict in the Post-Soviet Period

“…Importantly, those who had suffered at the hands of, and whose business ambitions were curbed by, members of Nazarbaev's inner circle understood that the problem was not rooted simply in the country's economic system, which was weighted in favour of the president's relations and close allies. They also understood that the structure of the political system was at fault (Junisbai & Junisbai 2005). There were no institutional checks against the arbitrary decisions of the president, just as there were no formal guarantees that would protect their enterprises from claims made by those closest to the president.…”

Bazaar Politics: The Fate of Marketplaces in Kazakhstan

“…Political divisions often revolve around competing economic, fi nancial, and business interests, with the presidential family itself front and center in the control of many sectors. 8 Using original data, including interviews, newspaper articles in Russian and Kazakh, government statistics, and city-planning documents, this article elucidates how politics and government policy shaped property struggles in the city of Almaty, Kazakhstan's southern fi nancial capital of 1. 5 on Kazakhstan tends to focus on the vast reserves of oil, gas, and other natural resources.…”