The Design of Teacher Incentive Pay and Educational Outcomes: Evidence from the New York City Bonus Program

Abstract

Teacher compensation schemes are often criticized for lacking a performance-based component. Proponents argue that teacher incentive pay can raise student achievement and stimulate systemwide innovation. We examine a group-based teacher incentive scheme implemented in New York City and investigate whether specific features of the program contributed to its ineffectiveness. Although overall the program had little effect on student achievement, we show that in schools where incentives to free-ride were weakest, the program led to small increases in math achievement. Our results underscore the importance of carefully considering the design of teacher incentive pay programs.

How effective are financial incentives for teachers?

“…Once again, though, the evidence is mixed. The best evidence on the impacts of group awards in the US comes from two studies that looked at schools in New York City that were randomly assigned to an incentive program [3], [4].…”

“…Once again, though, the evidence is mixed. The best evidence on the impacts of group awards in the US comes from two studies that looked at schools in New York City that were randomly assigned to an incentive program [3], [4]. While the program was designed to give schools flexibility in defining how incentives would be distributed (though they had to be awarded based on test scores), in practice nearly all schools adopted incentives of about $3,000 per teacher based on average school-wide achievement.…”

Teacher performance pay: Experimental evidence from Pakistan

“…The mean number of teachers in program schools at baseline was three. It is likely easier to effectively counteract any incentives for freeridership in such small schools than in larger schools with an identical bonus design (Goodman and Turner 2013).…”

“…1 1 Available rigorous evidence on the impacts of teacher performance pay is inconclusive: in some studies, there is consistent evidence of positive impacts (see, for example, Lavy 2002; Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan 2012;Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011;and Muralidharan 2012); in others, the evidence is mixed or conditional (see, for example, Glewwe et al 2010;Behrman, Parker, Todd, and Wolpin 2012;Sojourner, Mykerezi, and West 2014;and Fryer, Levitt, List, and Sadoff 2012; and yet in others, there is no evidence of positive impacts (see, for example, Fryer 2013;Springer et al 2011;and Goodman and Turner 2013).…”

Sobre a equidade e outros impactos dos incentivos monetários para professores

“…Foi detectada a prática de free-riding, em que os professores cujos alunos não foram testados não procuraram se esforçar, o que reduziu signifi cativamente o efeito dos incentivos do programa. Em escolas com um número menor de professores, os incentivos levaram a uma melhora signifi cativa na frequência dos professores, mas essa mudança não se traduziu em ganhos nos resultados dos alunos (GOODMAN;TURNER, 2010).…”