The Desire‐Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything

Sinhababu, Neil

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00864.x

Cited by 41 publications

(24 citation statements)

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“…And this affective reaction makes some of our beliefs about other people (who have nothing to do with teddy bears) more or less salient. I take this to be probably the best way of explaining the aforementioned empirical findings within the framework of the belief‐desire model (see Sinhababu, , ). I can see two ways in which this proposal could be worked out, but both of them postulate not one but two new mental states that we have no reason to postulate other than salvaging the belief‐desire model.…”

Section: Some Empirical Findings About Decision‐makingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Imagination in Decision‐Making

Nánay

2016

Mind & Language

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The psychological mechanism of decision‐making has traditionally been modeled with the help of belief‐desire psychology: the agent has some desires (or other pro‐attitudes) and some background beliefs and deciding between two possible actions is a matter of comparing the probability of the satisfaction of these desires given the background beliefs in the case of the performance of each action. There is a wealth of recent empirical findings about how we actually make decisions that seems to be in conflict with this picture. My aim is to outline an alternative model that is consistent with these empirical findings. This alternative model emphasizes the role imagination plays in our decisions: when we decide between two possible actions, we imagine ourselves in the situation that we imagine to be the outcome of these two actions and then compare these two imaginings.

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Section: Some Empirical Findings About Decision‐makingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Imagination in Decision‐Making

Nánay

2016

Mind & Language

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“…The proponent of the reductive account may, therefore, claim that intention need not be reducible to the strongest desire, and that her account may perfectly well accommodate the notion of commitment. This possibility is nicely explained in the account of intentions developed by Neil Sinhababu (2013). 11 This is basically how Jeff McMahan responds to Thomas Scanlon's argument against the Yes strategy.…”

Section: The Yes Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Does it Matter Who is Driving the Trolley?

Sušnik

2016

Dialectica

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Contemporary defenses of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) are mainly focused on avoiding the absurdity charge raised by Judith Thomson (). There are two strategies proposed in the literature for refuting Thomson's argument. In this paper I argue that answering Thomson's challenge comes at a heavy price: while both versions of the DDE that are developed within these two strategies successfully avoid the absurdity charge, they also remain incomplete. Thomson's argument reveals that the proponents of the DDE can at best provide a partial defense of the claim that intentions can be relevant to permissibility.

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“…29 Hampshire & Hart (1958:1-12), Grice (1971:263-79), Audi (1973);Harman (1976Harman ( :461-463), (1989, Davis (1984), Velleman (1985:33-61;1989), Setiya (2008:388-409), Ross 2009. 30 Davidson (1971:50;1978:91-4;1980:83-102), Bratman (1987:19-20,37-39;2009: ¤2), Mele (1992: ¤8), Holton (2008:51-55;2009: ¤2), Hieronymi (2009:201-20), Paul (2009:1-24), Sinhababu (2013).…”

Section: Appendix II ð Intentions and Beliefs: Good Intentions And Rementioning

confidence: 99%

Lying by Promising

Marsili

2016

Int Rev Pragmat

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This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I extend the traditional definition of lying to illocutionary acts executed by means of explicit performatives, focusing on promising. This is achieved in two steps. First, I discuss how the utterance of a sentence containing an explicit performative such as ÒI promise that ΦÓ can count as an assertion of its content Φ. Second, I develop a general account of insincerity meant to explain under which conditions a given illocutionary act can be insincere, and show how this applies to promises. I conclude that a promise to Φ is insincere (and consequently a lie) only if the speaker does not intend to Φ, or believes that he will not Φ, or both. In the second part, I test the proposed definition of lying by promising against the intuitions of ordinary language speakers. The results show that, unlike alternative accounts, the proposed definition makes the correct predictions in the cases tested. Furthermore, these results challenge the following necessary conditions for telling a lie with content p: that you have to assert p directly; that you have to believe that p be false; that p must be false; that you must aim to deceive the addressee into believing that p. In recent times, several philosophers have challenged this view, presenting some compelling counterexamples to the intention to deceive condition: lies under coercion (Siegler 1966:129, Carson 1988, lies to Ògo on the recordÓ, bald-faced lies (Carson 2 See Mannison (1969:132), Kupfer (1982:134), Simpson (1992), Williams (2002: 96), Faulkner (2007;, Meibauer (2005;. :17, Carson 2006:290, Sorensen 2007, Arico & Fallis 2013, and knowledge lies (Sorensen 2009). This has prompted many authors to drop (iii). 2However, rejecting (iii) comes at a price: a definition only featuring (i-ii) runs the risk of incorrectly ruling in fictional, ironical and metaphorical utterances. These are believed-false statements (i.e. they meet both condition (i) and (ii)), but are clearly not lies Condition (iii) correctly prevents the definition from counting these statements as lies. A putative alternative definition that rejects (iii) needs some alternative condition to play its role in ruling out these cases.A common way to respond to this challenge is to endorse an Ôassertion-basedÕ account of lying. The intuition behind this view is that the Ôstatement conditionÕ of the standard definition can be narrowed down, to require that the speaker genuinely assert the proposition that he believes to be false. Formally: An assertion-based definition can be further strengthened by requiring that also (iii) is satisfied, and some proponents of the intention to deceive condition endorse an assertion-based version of the standard view, in which both (iii) and (i*) 4 are required 3 Carson (2006; ), Sorensen (2007), Fallis (2009), Saul (2012), Stokke (2013. Except for Sorensen, all these authors spell out the assertion condition differently to (1*), specifying under which conditions a speakerÕs statement is a genuine assertion. 4 Chisholm a...

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The Desire‐Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything

Cited by 41 publications

References 4 publications

The Role of Imagination in Decision‐Making

The Role of Imagination in Decision‐Making

Does it Matter Who is Driving the Trolley?

Lying by Promising

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