830If we were to open our eyes to any crowded scene, it would be possible to understand the actions and intentions of those around us. However, the effortless nature with which we reach this understanding belies the complex processing of visual information that appears necessary to perform this task. In order to begin the study of the underlying mechanisms of action understanding, it is useful to have simplified scenarios that provide a tractable amount of information. One source of these scenarios has been provided by what are known as animacy displays. Animacy displays involve the motion of simple geometric shapes that evoke spontaneous attributions of life and social intent. In their classic work, Heider and Simmel (1944) investigated how observers would describe the movement of such shapes (i.e., a large triangle, a small triangle, and a small circle) as they navigated around a large open square. Their findings showed that people ascribe meaning to the movements, personifying the shapes and attributing emotions and goals. Further work focused on the temporal and spatial dynamics of these displays (Bassili, 1976), with various authors proposing that these properties, rather than other physical qualities of the displays, are key to the attribution of intention (Bloom & Veres, 1999;Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000;Tremoulet & Feldman, 2000;Zacks, 2004).Despite research investigating the attribution of intention in animacy displays via spatial and temporal dynamics, there have been few studies that point to specific categories of actions that facilitate the ascription of intention. Research that has focused on this aspect is that of Blythe, Todd, and Miller (1999) and Barrett, Todd, Miller, and Blythe (2005). Blythe et al. established six categories of intentional motion that they claimed were basic to all animacy displays: chasing, evading, courting, being courted, fighting, and playing. The authors argued that these basic categories make up a large proportion of human motion and are fundamental to the development and survival of people. Blythe et al. created representations of these intentions by instructing participants to control animated ants on a computer screen and to move them as though the ants were performing the intentions. On showing these displays to a second population of participants, the authors found that the observers were able to distinguish one intention from another at levels above chance. Blythe et al. found only minimal confusion between displays, with a small bias toward calling displays play. The authors claimed that this bias was due to an underlying belief that play is the more common intention and that we learn other intentions via play. Barrett et al. (2005), using a modified set of intentions-chasing, courting, fighting, following, guarding, and playing-showed results similar to those in Blythe et al., obtaining high accuracy in judgments of intention. The authors also showed a response bias for play and again showed slight confusions-for example, between following and chasing.In the presen...