The development of implicit intergroup cognition

Dunham, Yarrow; Baron, Andrew Scott; Banaji, Mahzarin R.

doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.04.006

Cited by 332 publications

(335 citation statements)

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“…Further support for this assumption is provided by Baron and Banaji (2006) who found that the mean level of implicit prejudice was equally high for different age groups (i.e., 6 years, 10 years, adults), while explicit prejudice continuously decreased as a function of age (see also Banse et al, in press). This finding has been interpreted as evidence for the relatively stable nature of implicit evaluations, which are assumed to be formed during the first years of life (see also Dunham et al, 2008).…”

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confidence: 80%

“…As recent experiences are not as deeply rooted as the highly overlearned early experiences, recent experiences may not be activated automatically. The presumed result is an attitudinal dissociation (Greenwald & Nosek, 2009), such that implicit evaluations are influenced by early experiences whereas explicit evaluations reflect recent experiences (Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2008;Rudman, 2004;Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000; see also Banse, Gawronski, Rebetez, Gutt, & Morton, in press). The relevance of early experiences for implicit evaluations is also echoed by Greenwald and Banaji (1995) who conceptualized implicit attitudes as "introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects" (p. 8).…”

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confidence: 99%

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On the determinants of implicit evaluations: When the present weighs more than the past

Castelli

Carraro

Gawronski

et al. 2010

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

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It is often assumed that implicit evaluations are influenced by early childhood experiences, whereas explicit evaluations reflect recent experiences. However, previous findings supporting this assumption remain ambiguous as to whether the differential effects of early versus recent experiences are driven by their temporal distance or their affective versus cognitive nature. Controlling for affectivity by using a predominantly affective attitude object (i.e., religion), the present study found that both implicit and explicit evaluations were related to recent, but not early, experiences. This pattern consistently emerged for self-reported experiences as well as independent reports from parents. Moreover, the relation of recent experiences to one type of evaluation remained significant after controlling for the respective other type of evaluation, suggesting that recent experiences influenced implicit and explicit evaluations independently. Implications for attitudinal dissociations and processes of attitude change are discussed

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confidence: 80%

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confidence: 99%

On the determinants of implicit evaluations: When the present weighs more than the past

Castelli

Carraro

Gawronski

et al. 2010

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

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“…One interpretation is that the infants' responses were driven mainly by familiarity: Specifically, the infants preferred the woman whose language was familiar and, by association, the food or toy in her possession (e.g., Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2008;Kinzler, Shutts, & Correll, 2010).…”

Section: Do Infants Prefer Their Ingroup and Align Their Choices Withmentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychological and sociomoral reasoning in infancy.

Baillargeon¹,

Scott²,

He³

et al. 2015

APA Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology, Volume 1: Attitudes and Social Cognition.

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IntroductionConsider the following scene: A man wearing a backpack is pacing leisurely back and forth in a large airport room. As he strolls, he occasionally crosses his arms, twirls the dangling straps of his backpack, or stuffs his hands in his pant pockets. At one point, he sits down, takes off his backpack, and removes from it a bag filled with assorted gummy bears; as he peers intently inside the bag, he selects and eats, one at a time, five red gummy bears.As adults, we would have no difficulty interpreting the man's actions. We might view his initial actions-pacing, crossing his arms, and so on-as intentional (as opposed to accidental) though not as directed toward any particular goal. In contrast, we might perceive his subsequent actions-removing the bag of gummy bears from his backpack and eating five red ones in succession-as both intentional and goal-directed. In analyzing these actions, we might build an explanation that attributes to the man a causally coherent set of motivational and epistemic mental states: He wants to eat gummy bears, he is particularly fond of red ones, and so when he spies one in the bag, he removes it and eats it.Next, consider a new scene: As the man is happily chewing on red gummy bears, he notices a second man approaching who is carrying two heavy suitcases. At this point, our scene might unfold according to different scenarios. In one, the first man greets the second man, offers to carry one of the suitcases, and holds out his bag of gummy bears. In another scenario, the first man continues to watch the second man but makes no move to approach him. In yet another scenario, the first man sticks out a leg to trip the second man, causing him to fall heavily.As adults, we would interpret and evaluate the first man's actions in the three scenarios very differently. In the first scenario, we might infer that the two men have a social group in common: They might be friends, coworkers, or relatives, for example. In the second scenario, we 3 would conclude that the two men are strangers. In both the first and second scenarios, we would view the first man's behavior as acceptable: Offering help and sharing food are expected prosocial behaviors in interactions with ingroup, but not outgroup, individuals. In contrast, the first man's behavior in the third scenario would seem to us beyond the pale: Unprovoked harmful actions, even against outgroup individuals, are generally viewed as unacceptable. We would categorize the first man as an antisocial lout, and we might file away distinctive characteristics as possible markers of a social group to be avoided in the future.Our discussion of the two scenes above illustrates the rich analyses that adults spontaneously engage in when watching others act. What are the developmental origins of these interpretations? Over the past 25 years, there has been a great deal of research on social cognition in infancy. This research can be roughly organized into two sets of questions that map neatly onto the two scenes above. First, when watching an agen...

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“…Previous research has shown that young children prefer members of their own group to members of other groups, recall relatively more positive information about members of their own group, and interpret their ambiguous actions in a more positive light (e.g., Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2008;Dunham et al, 2011;Kinzler et al, 2007). Further research could investigate the situations in which children excuse, or seek to minimise, the negative actions of their own group and the situations in which they accept responsibility for those negative actions.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do young children accept responsibility for the negative actions of ingroup members?

Over

Vaish

Tomasello

2016

Cognitive Development

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This study investigated whether young children accept responsibility for the negative actions of ingroup members. Five-year-old children watched a transgressor break someone else's valued possession. Depending on condition, this transgressor either belonged to the same group as the child or a different group from the child. Coding of children's nonverbal behaviour indicated that they displayed more signs of guilt (but not other negative emotions) when the transgressor belonged to their own group than the other group. Furthermore, when the transgressor belonged to their own group, children were more likely to say that their own group should apologise for the damage and that they themselves should try to repair the broken object. Children's connections to their groups are thus so profound that they appear to feel responsible for the negative actions of their group members even when they had no personal involvement in the harm those actions caused.

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The development of implicit intergroup cognition

Cited by 332 publications

References 42 publications

On the determinants of implicit evaluations: When the present weighs more than the past

On the determinants of implicit evaluations: When the present weighs more than the past

Psychological and sociomoral reasoning in infancy.

Do young children accept responsibility for the negative actions of ingroup members?

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