2018
DOI: 10.1017/s1474745618000034
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The Disadvantage of Membership: How Joining the GATT/WTO Undermines GSP

Abstract: Scholars and policymakers have long debated whether the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) enhances development through increased trade – i.e., whether the program is effective as a form of ‘trade-as-aid’. We argue that, by itself, GSP increases poor-country exports, but that when recipients join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), they realizefewerimports, and less gains in total trade, than GSP recipients that do not join the multilater… Show more

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Cited by 11 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…Donor countries use GSP to provide developing country beneficiaries additional market access, going beyond most favored nation treatment. Beyond the requirement to exclude high-income countries from eligibility and to respect the nondiscrimination principle (but see Tobin and Busch 2018), GATT allows each developed nation to set its program’s rules. GSP programs are “general” in that donors are supposed to provide the same access for the same products to all recipient nations, with an allowance for multiple program tiers.…”
Section: Gsp Programs and Rights-based Conditionalitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Donor countries use GSP to provide developing country beneficiaries additional market access, going beyond most favored nation treatment. Beyond the requirement to exclude high-income countries from eligibility and to respect the nondiscrimination principle (but see Tobin and Busch 2018), GATT allows each developed nation to set its program’s rules. GSP programs are “general” in that donors are supposed to provide the same access for the same products to all recipient nations, with an allowance for multiple program tiers.…”
Section: Gsp Programs and Rights-based Conditionalitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is widely supported in recent empirical applications (e.g. Hayakawa et al, 2020;Kox & Rojas-Romagosa, 2020;Tobin & Busch, 2019).…”
Section: Structural Gravity Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In fact, Gil-Pareja et al (2014) have obtained that NRTPs have led to an expansion of beneficiaries' exports to preference-granting countries, with the cumulative impact ranging from 26% after 4 years to 88% after 8 years. Tobin (2019) has observed that while GSP programs have increased developing countries' trade, they tend to trade (including to import) less under the GSP schemes (compared to GSP recipients that do not join the multilateral trading system) when they become GATT or WTO Members. The author has explained this outcome by the fact that by joining the GATT/WTO, countries enjoy non-discriminatory and hence more predictable (i.e., less subject to ad hoc conditionality) GSP programs.…”
Section: Background On Non-reciprocal Trade Preferencesmentioning
confidence: 99%