The Disappearing Conference Committee: The Use of Procedures by Minority Coalitions to Prevent Conferencing

Ryan, Josh M.

doi:10.1080/07343469.2010.544699

Cited by 8 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…17 Data for noncommemorative bills between 2005 and 2016 come from Emrich (2022a) who explores the conditions under which legislative leaders leverage conference committees to reconcile bicameral differences. 18 These consistent rates of conference committees diverge from congressional studies which show that conferences are an increasingly rare method used to resolve bicameral differences (Oleszek 2010;Ryan 2011). 19 Hawaii has 8,476 conference groupings in the data set (4,169 House and 4,307 Senate).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…This article focuses on a single institutional rule associated with conference committees, building upon recent research which has investigated the conditions under which state legislatures go to conference (Emrich 2022a). Unlike Congress which seldom goes to conference in recent sessions due to surging polarization (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2016;Ryan 2011;Shor and McCarty 2011), thousands of conference committees are appointed annually in the states. Further research could explore why many of these conference committees fail.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Conference Committee Structure and Majority Party Bias in U.S. States

Emrich

2022

State Politics Policy Q.

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How representative are conference delegations in state legislative chambers? I argue that differing conference rules across state legislative chambers influence majority party control over conference delegations. With an original data set encompassing all state-level conference committees from 2005 to 2016, I compare the observed policy preferences between conference delegation and majority party medians when the majority party unilaterally appoints and when the minority party has influence over conferee selection. My results show that in state legislative chambers where the minority can influence conference appointments, delegations are ideologically biased away from the majority party. These findings underscore how majority parties are limited when minorities have procedural rights.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 98%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Conference Committee Structure and Majority Party Bias in U.S. States

Emrich

2022

State Politics Policy Q.

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“…This would imply more conference committees when the chambers have different majorities. Minority governments in the United States avoid conference committees and prefer "amendment trading" (Ryan 2011). In Germany, governments might be willing to risk their bills' being referred to a conference committee when the chambers have different majorities (König et al 2013).…”

Section: The Determinants Of Conference Committee Formationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of Bicameral Conflict: The Formation of Conference Committees in Chile, 1990-2018

Navia¹,

Mimica²

2021

Lat Am Polit Soc

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In some countries, bicameral discrepancies are solved by the formation of a conference committee. In Chile, conference committees are exclusively and automatically formed when the second chamber rejects a bill passed in the first chamber or when the first chamber rejects the modifications to its original bill made by the second chamber. This article postulates 4 hypotheses for the determinants of conference committee formation. It tests them for the case of Chile’s sequential legislative process (1990–2018) using 2,183 bills that reached the stage where a conference committee could be formed. The 482 conference committees that resulted were more likely to be formed when chambers were controlled by different majorities, when passage required special voting thresholds, when bills were more important for the president, and when the bills had more approved amendments, but they were not more likely if the bill was introduced by legislators rather than the executive.

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“…Conferences were used frequently in the 1970s, with hundreds of conference reports considered each Congress. In recent years, conferences are rare (see also Ryan ), used just seven and three times in the 111th and 112th Congresses, respectively. Less formal processes for bicameral negotiations have become more common, empowering party leaders and reducing the formal involvement of many committee members (Sinclair ).…”

Section: Traditional Processes and Committee Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge, Expertise, and Committee Power in the Contemporary Congress

Curry

2018

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Scholars, practitioners, and observers typically portray committee influence as rooted in traditional congressional processes and practices, which are thought to provide committees with powerful opportunities to block and shape legislative proposals. The erosion of regular order processes suggests these traditional processes cannot underlie committee power in the contemporary Congress. Drawing on a mixed‐methods approach of interviews with congressional staff and an original data set of every amendment offered on the floor of the House of Representatives from 2005 to 2008, I find that absent these traditional process norms, committees in the contemporary Congress can rely on their specialized knowledge and expertise to influence the behavior of their colleagues and shape the legislation that passes.

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The Disappearing Conference Committee: The Use of Procedures by Minority Coalitions to Prevent Conferencing

Cited by 8 publications

References 25 publications

Conference Committee Structure and Majority Party Bias in U.S. States

Conference Committee Structure and Majority Party Bias in U.S. States

Determinants of Bicameral Conflict: The Formation of Conference Committees in Chile, 1990-2018

Knowledge, Expertise, and Committee Power in the Contemporary Congress

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