No abstract

This paper examines the approval of government bills in Chile, evaluating the effect of presidential prerogatives and policy substance, and considering both bill-specific and contextual effects. The results show that presidential prerogatives over financial policy as well as the ability to affect the congressional agenda through urgent bill scheduling, significantly influence government bill approval. As expected, government success is enhanced during the honeymoon period. However, changes in public approval of the president do not appear to exert a significant effect on the passage of presidential bills.

This article maps current constitutional adjudication systems in 17 Latin American democracies. Using recent theoretical literature, the authors classify systems by type (concrete or abstract), timing (a priori or a posteriori), and jurisdiction (centralized or decentralized). This approach captures the richness and diversity of constitutional adjudication in Latin America, where most countries concurrently have two or more mechanisms. Four models of constitutional adjudication are currently in use. In the past, weak democratic institutions and the prevalence of inter partes, as opposed to erga omnes, effects of judicial decisions, prevented the development of constitutional adjudication. Today, democratic consolidation has strengthened the judiciary and fostered constitutional adjudication. After discussing the models, the authors highlight the role of the judiciary in the constitutional adjudication bodies, the broad range of options existing to initiate this adjudication process, and the prevalence of amparo (habeas corpus) provisions.

Chile is experiencing a declining electoral participation.

This article updates our earlier finding that democracies outperformed dictatorships in 1950-90 by achieving lower infant mortality rates at every level of development. Now we show that this holds even post-Cold War and after the latest wave of democratization. Using 1990-97 data, we again find that democracies outdo dictatorships, though the difference is somewhat smaller now. One key finding is relevant to policymakers: foreign direct investment and aid both significantly reduce IMRs in democracies, but not in dictatorships. Giving money to dictatorships, whether in the form of aid or investment, makes either no difference or even hurts children born there.