The Domain of Reasons

Abstract

The idly browsing reader might think this is a book about ethics and practical reason. It is not. This is a comprehensive account of 'the relation between self, thought and world' (1). It is an account of this relation that explains its possibility in terms of our a priori grasp of 'objective universal truths about reason relations: irreal, pure objects of cognition that mediate between knowing subject and known world' (504). Its explanatory ambitions are comparable to (at least) the first two of Kant's Critiques. Yet where Kant's eighteenth-century critical project delivers knowledge of the world by way of the unknowable 'noumena' of 'transcendental idealism', Skorupski's twenty-first-century critical project delivers that knowledge by way of the knowable 'normative dispositions' of his 'normative view'. The result is as historically rich as it is philosophically illuminating. Even though it does not display all the 'Hollywood' qualities of some recent works with which it will inevitably be compared, The Domain of Reasons stands on a par with the most significant books on reasons, normativity and the mind published in recent years. It is a 'magnum opus', and not only because of its size. Readers expecting a discussion of contemporary meta-ethics might be tempted to stop reading at this point. To temper that temptation, here are some highlights from the book that have a direct impact on the hot issues of the meta-ethical present. First,

Rethinking Right: Moral Epistemology in Management Research

“…For more philosophical discussions about the distinction between objective and subjective reasons, see Harman (2015) and Sepielli (Forthcoming). 5 In this article, we do not defend a particular view of moral objectivity, an activity already undertaken by several moral philosophers (e.g., Enoch, 2011;Scanlon, 2014;Setiya, 2015;Skorupski, 2010). One widely accepted account of moral objectivity is "reflective equilibrium" (Goodman, 1955;Rawls, 1971).…”

“…The marginalization of values, in part, derives from an "old sociology of morality" (Abend 2010), which assumes that only positive statements are capable of being objectively defended, and which, as Abend notes, does not properly reflect recent metaethical development on moral cognitivism (Dworkin 1996;Enoch 2011;Scanlon 2014;Setiya 2015;Skorupski 2010;Smith 1994). 10 Wicks and Freeman (1998), too, take a strong stand on this issue: "Avoiding 10 Most but not all moral philosophers accept moral objectivity.…”

“…Contemporary anti-objectivists accept, at least, the epistemic features of moral objectivism (Blackburn 1984;Gibbard 1990). 11 For more philosophical discussion about the objective status of moral knowledge, see Boyd (1988); Brink (1989); Enoch (2011);Hampton (2012); Scanlon (2014); Setiya (2015); Skorupski (2010); Smith (1994); Shafer-Landau (2003).…”

Fittingness First

“…Such incentives can give you reason to want a headache, and to bring one about, but they do not, strictly speaking, give you reasons for a headache. 14 The second response is to draw a distinction between two kinds of reasons to value.…”

Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?

“…Epistemic Normativity is widely defended or taken for granted in contemporary normativity theory and epistemology. In addition to proponents of the strategy I criticize below, see for instance Scanlon (1998), Kelly (2003), Cuneo (2007), Skorupski (2010), Raz (2011), andParfit (2011). 7 See Grimm (2009) for an overview of the issue of grounding epistemic normativity.…”