The domestic effectiveness of international human rights monitoring in established democracies. The case of the UN human rights treaty bodies

Abstract

Although the reporting process under UN human rights treaties is considered one of the most important universal mechanisms to monitor the implementation of human rights, its actual domestic effects have hardly been studied. This is surprising in the light of the rather extensive work involved and resources spent on the reporting process by states and UN human rights treaty bodies. This article attempts to fill the scholarly neglect by examining the effectiveness of this process in three countries, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland. It also explores some more general conceptual, theoretical and methodological issues with respect to the definition and measurement of effectiveness of international (human rights) standards at the domestic level. The empirical results, which are based on extensive document analysis as well as 175 interviews, are used to test two hypotheses based on domestic and transnational mobilization as well as reputational and legitimacy-based explanations. The article especially finds support for the liberalist mobilization thesis, while only limited support is found for reputational and legitimacy-based explanations, at least in established liberal democracies.

For better or worse: Shaming, faming, and human rights abuse

“…Some studies suggest that HR shaming does not improve the shamed country’s HR policies, and can even cause more abuse or cause countries to offset improvements in the protection of certain rights by more violations of other rights (Hafner-Burton, 2008). Other studies found that shaming is positively associated with HR protection with intervening factors such as: sufficient presence of reform-minded actors in the targeted country (Krommendijk, 2015; Murdie & Davis, 2012) or in the country’s neighborhood (Bell, Clay & Murdie, 2012), economic openness (Franklin, 2008), and pressure by an external third party (Murdie & Davis, 2012). The theoretical question that stands at the heart of the argument that shaming changes governments’ policies is how this happens.…”

Introduction: contesting human rights – pathways of change

“…Numerous studies suggest that democracy and peace make states more receptive to international influence -albeit sometimes more during transitions than under stable configurations (Mitchell and McCormick 1988;Davenport 1999;Simmons 2009). Moreover, the impact of international initiatives for human rights is cumulative and interactive through combinations of institutions from above and campaigns from below, growing waves of advocacy and reform, law and policy, and empowerment and protection (Dancy 2013;Simmons 2013;Krommendijk 2015;Sandholtz and Stiles 2009;Hillebrecht 2014). Thus, the multi-level pathways charted by Sandholtz and Feldman (Chapter 6), Goodhart (Chapter 8), and Meili (Chapter 7) have special salience.…”

Monitoring and Implementation of Children’s Rights

“…He found (encouragingly) that most of the legislative, policy, or other measures that were taken (partly) as a result of COs of the various UN treaty bodies were related to the COs of the CRC Committee; his research shows that 33 of the 74 responses related to the COs from the CRC Committee (Krommendijk 2014: 374) (compared for instance to only four COs emanating from the ICCPR). Although COs are not binding, Krommendijk (2015) argues that one crucial precondition for the effectiveness of what are termed "reputational models" of accountability is that the target State and the wider domestic and international audience bestow reputation on the treaty bodies and consider them as important and legitimate. The possible reputational costs for States for not acting upon COs are low if a treaty body is not considered legitimate and does not have a solid reputation.…”