1987
DOI: 10.1007/bf00116941
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The Downsian model of electoral participation: Formal theory and empirical analysis of the constituency size effect

Abstract: This paper applies a game-theoretic model of participation under uncertainty to investigate the negative relationship between constituency size and voter turnout rates: the constituency size effect. We find that this theoretical model accounts for almost all of the variation in turnout due to size in cross sectional data from school budget referenda.

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Cited by 107 publications
(47 citation statements)
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“…However, whether this simple model of voting is consistent with the data is an empirical question. Hansen et al (1987) 1 For an overview of the literature, see Aldrich (1993Aldrich ( , 1997, Green and Shapiro (1994, ch. 4), and Matsusaka and Palda (1993).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, whether this simple model of voting is consistent with the data is an empirical question. Hansen et al (1987) 1 For an overview of the literature, see Aldrich (1993Aldrich ( , 1997, Green and Shapiro (1994, ch. 4), and Matsusaka and Palda (1993).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A ballot proposition (or measure) is a proposed law or constitutional amendment which takes effect if a majority of the voters approve it. To the best of my knowledge, the only other closeness tests which use ballot propositions are Filer and Kenny (1980) and Hansen, Palfrey, and Rosenthal (1987).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…15 In the estimation, we ignore the actual costs drawn by the voters in each election, and we treat the upper bound of the distribution of voting costs as the concealed parameter of interest. 16 Recall that in the actual experiment, the distribution of voting costs  () was uniform on [0 55].…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%