The dynamics of Kadyrov’s regime: between autonomy and dependence

This introduction to the special issue looks back at 30 years of nation-building in the post-Soviet states. Initial hopes that national self-determination would reinforce democratization proved misplaced. While that synergy worked well in the Baltic states, elsewhere authoritarian leaders embraced nationalism, while democracies like Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine lost control of parts of their territory to secessionist movements backed by Russia. Each of the post-Soviet states promoted a national language (except for Belarus) and forged a new historical narrative for their “imagined community,” but in most cases they remained multi-ethnic and multi-lingual communities. In recognition of this persisting ethnic diversity, nation-building was accompanied by policies of ethnicity management. The international economic environment was rapidly changing due to globalization, posing new challenges for nation-builders. The gender dimension is important to the new national identities being forged in the post-Soviet space: the categories of race and class, less so. The article concludes with a review of the salient features of each of the newly-independent states.

Section: From Nation-building To Ethnicity Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thirty Years of Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet States

Rutland

2023

“…In a much-publicized speech to a group of leading Russian entrepreneurs in 2016, he went as far as to declare: "We do not and cannot have any other unifying idea but patriotism" (Putin 2016). 15 A notable exception here is Chechnya, where the current leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, has been given a free hand in return for crushing the North Caucasian Islamists (Souleimanov and Jasutis 2016;Wilhelmsen 2018).…”

Section: Phase 3: the Return Of The Russians (The 2010s)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 15 A notable exception here is Chechnya, where the current leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, has been given a free hand in return for crushing the North Caucasian Islamists (Souleimanov and Jasutis 2016; Wilhelmsen 2018). …”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Russkiias the NewRossiiskii? Nation-Building in Russia After 1991

Blakkisrud

2022

Russia’s post-1991 nation-building project has been torn between competing interpretations of national identity. Whereas the other former Soviet republics opted for nation-building centered on the titular nation, Russia’s approach to national identity was framed by the fact that the RSFSR had been defined not as a designated national homeland but as a multi-ethnic federation. This, coupled with Russia’s definition as the legal successor of the Soviet Union, suggesting continuity and a history of uninterrupted statehood, has enabled a range of rivaling understandings of how to define the “nation.” Focusing on top-down official nation-building, this article examines how, against a backdrop of shifting political contexts, structural constraints, and popular attitudes, the Kremlin has gradually revised its understanding of what constitutes the “Russian nation.” Four models for post-Soviet Russian nation-building are identified – the ethnic, the multi-national, the civic, and the imperial. Over time, the correlation of forces among these has shifted. The article concludes that, despite some claims of an ethno-nationalist turn after 2014, the Kremlin still employs nationalism instrumentally: National identity has undoubtedly become more russkii-centered, but, at the same time, the Kremlin keeps the definition of “Russianness” intentionally vague, blurring the boundaries between “nation” and “civilization.”

“…The esteem of the Kremlin persisted even during Medvedev’s presidency (Black 2015, 53; Falkowski 2015, 26–33). Kadyrov depends on Putin too, namely for federal transfers and regime security (Souleimanov and Jasutis 2016). Then, since 2007, Russia’s confrontational stance towards the West made Grozny’s contacts with China and the Middle East more valuable, inducing Moscow to support their development.…”

Section: Chechnya’s Paradiplomacy 2000–2020mentioning

confidence: 99%

Chechnya’s Paradiplomacy 2000–2020: The Emergence and Evolution of External Relations of a Reincorporated Territory

Klyszcz

2022

From the year 2000 on, Chechen official international relations – called “paradiplomacy” – have centered around legitimacy-building, security cooperation and investment attraction, priorities set by the republic’s first official, pro-Russian president, Akhmat Kadyrov (in office 2000–2004). Kadyrov’s successors, Alu Alkhanov (2004–2007) and Ramzan Kadyrov (2007–to date) developed Grozny’s international engagements further, introducing new partners – such as China – and new dimensions to the external action – such as militarization. At each step, Grozny operated between full autonomy and collaboration with Moscow, involving itself in high-level diplomacy and furthering Moscow’s agenda abroad, primarily in the Middle East. In this article, I argue that Chechen paradiplomacy is an instrument for the inclusion of Chechnya into the governance structures of Russia’s federal order. The argument rests on two premises: Chechnya’s paradiplomacy is framed by the Kremlin’s proactive support and coordination, and Chechnya’s paradiplomacy is closely connected to the Kremlin’s security priorities. Since reincorporation, Chechen paradiplomacy has not been an addition to Russian federal relations but an intrinsic part of the post-2000 political arrangement between Grozny and Moscow. To empirically ground this argument, I trace the evolution of Chechen paradiplomacy across the three post-incorporation presidencies, ending in 2020.