The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–1996

Binder, Sarah A.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511816406.032

Cited by 66 publications

(118 citation statements)

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“…A long line of prior studies analyzed the effects of divided government, but existing work focuses almost exclusively on how partisan control of our governing institutions affects legislative outputs (e.g., Binder, 1999Binder, , 2003Coleman, 1999;Edwards, Barrett, & Peake, 1997;C. O. Jones, 1994;Krutz, 2001;Mayhew, 1991Mayhew, , 2005.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Divided Government and Delay in the Legislative Process

Hughes

Carlson

2015

American Politics Research

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Despite a robust history of studies examining legislative outputs, little is known about how divided government affects the policymaking process. This article examines these dynamics by analyzing the relationship between divided government and delay in the consideration of important legislation. We also introduce a more nuanced measure of divided government-the strength of the president's party in Congress-that measures both the presence and magnitude of inter-branch conflict. Using a Cox proportional hazards model to analyze delay of important legislation from 1949 to 2010, the results indicate both divided government and the strength of the president's party in Congress are significantly related to legislative delay. Moreover, presidential party strength significantly interacts with partisan polarization. When the parties are moderately or highly polarized, there is a significant relationship between the strength of the president's party and legislative delay; this relationship is insignificant at lower levels of polarization. Taken together, these findings enhance our understanding of how inter-branch conflict affects the policymaking process in Congress.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Divided Government and Delay in the Legislative Process

Hughes

Carlson

2015

American Politics Research

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“…First, in a system where power is separated between legislative and executive branches of government, unified partisan control across the branches enables both to pursue a common interest with little political conflict. However, divided government-that is, when a party that holds a majority in one or both of the legislative chambers differs from the party of the executive-imposes policymaking obstacles that undermine the governments' capacity to change the status quo (Binder, 1999(Binder, , 2003Coleman, 1999;Edwards, Barrett, & Peake, 1997;Howell, Adler, Cameron, & Riemann, 2000;Sundquist, 1988). Second, parties within legislatures are capable of crafting procedural rules to their advantage, under certain conditions, that may facilitate or obstruct the policymaking process.…”

Section: Partisan Competition and Legislative Efficiencymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Data are derived from Klarner et al (2013). Binder (1999Binder ( , 2003 suggests that conditions surrounding bicameralism should influence the efficiency with which legislatures process legislative items. Although conventional wisdom suggests that relative to a unicameral policymaking process, bicameralism should inhibit legislative efficiency, 13 Binder suggests the effect of bicameralism on legislative efficiency is conditional on the amount of policy disagreement between legislators in each chamber.…”

Section: Measuring Other Sources Of Legislative Efficiencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Partisan Competition and the Efficiency of Lawmaking in American State Legislatures, 1991-2009

Hicks

2015

American Politics Research

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Does partisan competition explain why some legislatures are more efficient at processing legislation than others? This article argues that legislative parties' strategic incentives and capabilities are a function of their size, their ideological homogeneity, and the governor's party. It shows that the distribution of legislative seats between the parties influences legislative efficiency, depending on the level of polarization between the parties and the party of the governor. A small partisan seat margin reduces legislative efficiency when the parties are polarized and when the government is divided. It provides further evidence that polarization and divided government can either positively or negatively affect legislative efficiency, depending on the distribution of seats held between the two parties. This research contributes to the literature by demonstrating the conditional influence of political parties. Based in multilevel modeling techniques, this research also contributes to the literature with robust evidence including 48 state legislatures, through 19 years.

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“…Fundamentally, interbranch confiict occurs with Congress pulling in one direction and the president in another (Binder 1999;Bond and Fleisher 1990). Fiorina (1996) suggests that differing policy and electoral interests reinforce institutional rivalries between the executive and legislative branches.…”

Section: Xpectations Of Preemption or Supportmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Motivating this, when the two chambers are gridlocked by internal policy disputes over politics or ideology. Congress may become paralyzed in its ability to pass any kind of legislation (Binder 1999). This is exacerbated by increases in party polarization in general (Jones 2001).…”

Section: Xpectations Of Preemption or Supportmentioning

confidence: 99%

In Lieu of Legislation

Belco

Rottinghaus

2013

Political Research Quarterly

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In the legislative process, presidents may negotiate with Congress or use unilateral action as a bargaining tool. When presidents issue a unilateral order during the legislative process, do these orders "preempt" or "support" legislation? We match unilateral orders with related legislative activity and find presidents are more likely to use unilateral orders to "preempt" legislation when the issue is on the president's agenda or in the second half of their second terms but "support" legislation when of the same party as the bill sponsor. These findings suggest that presidents not only take advantage of Congressional incapacity but also exert unilateral power in support of legislation.

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The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–1996

Cited by 66 publications

References 1 publication

Divided Government and Delay in the Legislative Process

Divided Government and Delay in the Legislative Process

Partisan Competition and the Efficiency of Lawmaking in American State Legislatures, 1991-2009

In Lieu of Legislation

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