The dynamics of the city-managing-county model in China: implications for rural–urban interaction

Yang, Zhenjie; Wu, Alfred M.

doi:10.1177/0956247814566905

Cited by 16 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…The above argument may exaggerate the benefits of the central personnel control system on the one hand and neglect the heterogeneous governance structure in China on the other. To some extent, neither central nor local authorities are so benevolent towards their constituents in China [25, 57]. But homegrown regional leaders are more willing to promote basic public services such as education according to our empirical evidence.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The logic of basic education provision and public goods preferences in Chinese fiscal federalism

2019

PLoS ONE

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Without election or re-election motivations, what factors have impacted public goods preferences in an authoritarian country such as China? More specifically, what makes political elites be devoted to or not be devoted to local public goods provision? This study, using basic education provision as an example, intends to gauge the impact of leadership selection on public goods provision in China. It is found that career trajectories of politicians have a bearing on basic education provision. The findings suggest that even under a top-down appointment system, homegrown politicians are more willing to cater to local preferences, especially on basic education provision, which suggests an extension of Riker’s theory, applied in a non-democratic regime. Numerous studies have examined the impacts of decentralization on a variety of aspects of public governance in different contexts. Nevertheless, the unique contribution of this study is its policy implication that political centralization may not be an effective solution for local public governance even in an authoritarian context.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The logic of basic education provision and public goods preferences in Chinese fiscal federalism

2019

PLoS ONE

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“…Figure 1 shows the location of the four case study megacity regions. Our unit of analysis was the entire land area of each megacity region including counties and countylevel cities the core city "leads" as well as township, town, and street-level administrative divisions (Yang & Wu, 2015). Shanghai and Chongqing are provincial cities, and Suzhou and Chengdu are prefecturelevel cities.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

From coordinated to integrated urban and rural development in China’s megacity regions

Chen

LeGates

Fang

2018

Journal of Urban Affairs

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Since reform and opening up began in 1978, China has developed and urbanized rapidly, and a dual urban-rural economy has evolved in its megacity regions. Unlike the United States and other countries with neoliberal regimes that rely on the market to adjust economic relations and where there is little explicit national-level planning, China is a regionally decentralized developmental state where government plays a major role in development. Coordinated urban-rural development has been national policy since 2003, and China began to experiment with what is termed integrated urban-rural development in 2006. This article describes coordinated urban-rural development in China's 2 developing megacity regions with the most advanced coordination programs (Chengdu and Chongqing) and 2 highly urbanized megacity regions with well-developed strategies to integrate city and countryside (Shanghai and Suzhou). It describes 4 models of the coordination process: the municipal government-led top-down model (post-1990 Shanghai), empowering the entrepreneurial township government model (post-2008 Suzhou), the negotiation model (post-2003 Chengdu), and the labor transfer model (post-2003 Chongqing). It discusses the forms that integration of city and countryside have taken in the most advanced Chinese megacity regions and their implications for other cities in China and other developing countries with different characteristics and at different development stages.

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“…This is because local governments in China provide the bulk of public services to local constituents, whereas about 70% of public expenditure is handled by subnational governments and 55% by subprovincial governments (World Bank, 2002). Such intergovernmental fiscal relations have been argued to affect many aspects of urban development in China, including regional collaboration (Ye, 2014), spatial inequality (Zhang, 2006), rural-urban interaction (Yang & Wu, 2016), local capture (Wu, 2013), and so on. With significant variations in both inter-and intraprovincial decentralization (Liu et al, 2017;Wu & Wang, 2013), it remains an intriguing question whether or not the variation in expenditure decentralization across provinces has an impact on urban agglomeration.…”

Section: Fiscal Decentralization and Urban Agglomerationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of fiscal decentralization on urban agglomeration: Evidence from China

2018

Journal of Urban Affairs

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In the literature on urban studies, the size distribution of cities has been attributed to a random growth process where transportation externalities, congestion costs, and capital formation all play a crucial role. However, the classic economics models do not fully capture the impact of political institutions, particularly fiscal decentralization, on urban size distribution and fail to explain the political economy of urban agglomeration. As a major transitional economy, China's economic decentralization, in conjunction with political control, portends a more complex environment for urban agglomeration and offers a new ground to analyze its institutional roots and policy implications. This study employs a panel data analysis of Chinese provinces between 1994 and 2015 and finds a pattern where more decentralized regions (provinces) are associated with stronger dominance of large cities for the whole study period. However, the period between 1994 and 2003 displays a different pattern wherein fiscal decentralization is negatively associated with urban agglomeration. Such phenomena can be attributed to the heated competition among local governments and the absorption of resources by dominant cities under the framework of fiscal decentralization in China, particularly in the recent years. More effective coordination is called upon to mitigate the unintended outcome of fiscal decentralization without proper control in shaping urban hierarchy in China and the findings provide lessons for other developing countries.

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The dynamics of the city-managing-county model in China: implications for rural–urban interaction

Cited by 16 publications

References 20 publications

The logic of basic education provision and public goods preferences in Chinese fiscal federalism

The logic of basic education provision and public goods preferences in Chinese fiscal federalism

From coordinated to integrated urban and rural development in China’s megacity regions

The impact of fiscal decentralization on urban agglomeration: Evidence from China

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