The economic and strategic motives for antidumping filings

Abstract

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Friendly Fire? The Impact of US Antidumping Enforcement on US Exporters

“…Prusa (2001) briefly discusses the strategic issues involved in a government's decision to adopt an antidumping policy-actions may be aimed at deterring other users of antidumping, but this deterrence may fail resulting in a prisoner's dilemma with retaliation occurring instead. Prusa and Skeath (2002) more fully develop this point, finding evidence consistent with strategic motivations behind antidumping filings. Blonigen and Bown (2003), applying a trigger price model which allows for the threat of an antidumping action against a country to restrain that country's own antidumping activity, find some evidence consistent with this prediction for the United States.…”

Trade deflection and trade depression

“…Finally, we speculate that the results of this paper suggest an additional explanation for the proliferation of antidumping laws around the world (Miranda et al, 1998;Prusa, 2001) that has not previously been investigated. Much of the prior literature commenting on this proliferation has focused on the retaliation argument: countries adopt trade remedy laws in order to establish a credible retaliatory threat that will discourage foreign trade remedies targeted against their exporters (Prusa and Skeath, 2002;Blonigen and Bown, 2003). Our results indicate that the imposition of a US trade remedy can lead to a substantial export surge to a third country's market.…”

Determinants for Macroeconomic Factors of Antidumping: A Comparative Analysis of India and China

“…Some research classified retaliatory patterns into practical retaliation, potential threat of retaliation, and governmental motive. Prusa and Skeath (2002) explained that countries with numerous antidumping filings against other countries are also the targets of many filings from those countries; further, there are many cases of antidumping filings between traditional antidumping users. Blonigen and Bown (2003) believed that the United States might evade antidumping filings against those countries with organized legal antidumping systems for fear of their retaliation.…”