No abstract

No abstract

In this paper we study worldwide antidumping (AD) case filing patterns in order to determine the extent to which economic versus strategic incentives explain the behavior of countries employing AD actions. We compare four main hypotheses: big supplier, big change in imports, tit-for-tat and the club effect. We find strong support that AD actions are directed at big suppliers, but far weaker evidence that AD actions are filed against suppliers whose imports have surged. We also find very strong evidence that AD actions are used strategically to deter further use of AD and/or to punish trading partners who have used AD. Our findings reject the notion that the rise in AD activity is solely explained by an increase in unfair trading.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: This paper takes a critical look at the trends in worldwide antidumping (AD) case filings during the last two decades. We examine the motives for AD filings by countries in an attempt to identify whether economic or strategic concerns are driving the recent upsurge in AD use. We begin by providing a comprehensive overview of the data on cases initiated in the 1980 to 1998 period. We then use non-parametric methods to identify national motivations for the use of antidumping. Results show considerable support for the importance of strategic concerns in driving AD case filings. This suggests that the rise in AD activity cannot be solely explained by an increase in unfair trading practices. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

No abstract