The economic effects of illegal migration under the minimum wage policy of a source country

Sun, Shuqin; Tawada, Makoto

doi:10.1111/j.1435-5957.2007.00108.x

Cited by 2 publications

References 10 publications

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Illegal migration, enforcement, and minimum wage

Epstein

Heizler

Research in Labor Economics

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Non-Technical AbstractThis paper examines the connection between illegal migration, minimum wages and enforcement policy. We first explore the employers' decision regarding the employment of illegal migrants in the presence of an effective minimum wage. We show that the employers' decision depends on the wage gap between those of the legal and illegal workers and on the penalty for employing illegal workers. We consider the effects a change in the minimum wage has on the employment of illegal immigrants and local workers. We conclude by considering the optimal migration policy taking into consideration social welfare issues.Keywords: illegal immigration, migration policy, minimum wage, interest groups. Bar-Ilan University AbstractThis paper examines the connection between illegal migration, minimum wages and enforcement policy. We first explore the employers' decision regarding the employment of illegal migrants in the presence of an effective minimum wage. We show that the employers' decision depends on the wage gap between those of the legal and illegal workers and on the penalty for employing illegal workers. We consider the effects a change in the minimum wage has on the employment of illegal immigrants and local workers. We conclude by considering the optimal migration policy taking into consideration social welfare issues.

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Illegal migration, enforcement, and minimum wage

Epstein

Heizler

Research in Labor Economics

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The Role of Risk Preference in Immigration and Minimum Wage Policies

Wang¹,

Zhu

2014

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &Amp; Policy

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This paper examines the effects of two enforcement policies and a minimum wage policy in controlling illegal immigration and improving welfare when capital is immobile. The model highlights the importance of the role of risk preference by considering various attitudes to risk held by illegal immigrants and host firms. It is shown that the effect of internal enforcement on the wage rate in host firms depends on the attitude to risk of illegal immigrants and host firms. It is also shown that the impacts of the minimum wage legislation differ according to risk preference and the degree of labor employment elasticity to the source wage. Moreover, attitude to risk is shown to be important in determining the effectiveness of policies on welfare.

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The economic effects of illegal migration under the minimum wage policy of a source country

Cited by 2 publications

References 10 publications

Illegal migration, enforcement, and minimum wage

Illegal migration, enforcement, and minimum wage

The Role of Risk Preference in Immigration and Minimum Wage Policies

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