The Economics of Terrorism

Intriligator, Michael D.

doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00287.x

Cited by 22 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…7 Proof is in the Appendix. Bier et al, 2007;Intriligator, 2010;Sandler and Siqueira, 2006). This proposition shows that a general equilibrium framework preserves this result.…”

Section: Proofsupporting

confidence: 60%

Immigration Policy and Counterterrorism

Bandyopadhyay

Sandler

2012

SSRN Journal

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A terrorist group, based in a developing (host) country, draws unskilled and skilled labor from the productive sector to conduct attacks in that nation and abroad. The host nation chooses proactive countermeasures. Moreover, a targeted developed nation decides its optimal mix of immigration quotas and defensive counterterrorism actions. Even though proactive measures in the host country may not curb terrorism directed at it, it may still be advantageous in terms of national income. Increases in the unskilled immigration quota augment terrorism against the developed country. By contrast, increases in the skilled immigration quota can reduce terrorism in the developed country if skilled migrants have a small marginal impact on terrorism there. When the developed country assumes a leadership role, it strategically should reduce its skilled immigration quota to induce more proactive measures in the host developing country.

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“…7 Proof is in the Appendix. Bier et al, 2007;Intriligator, 2010;Sandler and Siqueira, 2006). This proposition shows that a general equilibrium framework preserves this result.…”

Section: Proofsupporting

confidence: 60%

Immigration Policy and Counterterrorism

Bandyopadhyay

Sandler

2012

SSRN Journal

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“…Analytically, terrorism has been modeled in dynamic settings by several authors using a plethora of frameworks-for surveys see e.g., Bueno de Mesquita [20] (2008) and Intriligator [21] (2010)-such as systems of differential and difference equations, optimal control, dynamic programming, and differential-difference equations, (e.g., Feichtinger et al [22] (2001); Udwadia et al [23] (2006); Caulkins et al [24] (2008); Jensen [25] (2011); Faria and Arce [26] (2012b)). New approaches include integral equations (e.g., Faria [27] (2011)) and stochastic models such as queue theory and optimal stopping approaches (see Kaplan [28] (2010) and Jensen [29] (2016)).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Refugee Game: The Relationship between Individual Security Expenditures and Collective Security

Faria

Novak²,

Bagchi

et al. 2020

Games

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This paper studies a three player hierarchical differential game (with a large country, a small country, and a terrorist organization), to analyze the actual European refugee situation. Terrorists may enter Europe as refugees, taking advantage of the Open Door Policy, to attack both countries. There are two scenarios: myopia and full awareness. Countries are myopic when they ignore each other’s security efforts, and the terrorist group only considers the weakest link’s security efforts. A comparison between the scenarios shows that for an extremely impatient large country, full awareness yields a greater level of security effort for the large country, a greater level of security effort for the small country, and more terrorist attacks. This is, however, an unstable equilibrium. The full awareness model with a patient large country is stable and lies in between the previous model and the myopic model. Although it yields larger investments in security, this still results in more terrorist attacks than the myopic model. Continental safety is higher in the myopic model than in the full awareness model.

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“…There are numerous such examples in northeast Nigerian. Fishing and farming have been banned in some areas, ostensibly to prevent the provision of produce to organised armed group fighters (Intriligator 2010). The types and heights of crops grown are restricted and trees cut down to prevent fighters hiding.…”

Section: Gendered Effects Of Seemingly Gender-neutral Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Gendered Security Harms: State Policy and the Counterinsurgency Against Boko Haram

Pearson¹,

NAGARAJAN²

2020

African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review

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Scholars have critiqued the incorporation of gender into counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism: programmes have instrumentalised the Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda towards state-centric goals and essentialised the women (and men) they encounter.Furthermore, as Huckerby outlines, the explicit inclusion of gender in security policy can produce specific gendered security harms: coercive and non-coercive practices; securitization of women's rights; and lack of attention to the gendered effects of seemingly gender-neutral policy. This article engages Huckerby's typology to explore the gendered security harms produced in Nigeria's counter-insurgency against 'Boko Haram'. It suggests first that a simplistic approach to women, not gendered power relations, leaves Nigeria unable to respond to the complex gendered dynamics of jihadist actors in the northeast. Second, a neglect of human rights and the role of state actors in abuses actively enable gendered security harms. The article concludes that Nigeria is therefore still failing to protect women.

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The Economics of Terrorism

Cited by 22 publications

References 26 publications

Immigration Policy and Counterterrorism

Immigration Policy and Counterterrorism

The Refugee Game: The Relationship between Individual Security Expenditures and Collective Security

Gendered Security Harms: State Policy and the Counterinsurgency Against Boko Haram

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