The economics of the most favored nation clause

Schwartz, Warren F.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609442.003

Cited by 31 publications

(19 citation statements)

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“…In light of the inevitable bargaining inefficiencies that arise in the absence of the MFN rule, we move now to the second step of our discussion and examine whether the MFN rule addresses the bilateral opportunism problem and thereby promotes efficiency. As Schwartz and Sykes (1997) argue, it is natural to expect that the MFN rule could be helpful in this regard. After all, the concession-erosion concern is addressed under the MFN rule, since foreign country 1 is then assured of receiving any home tariff cut that is subsequently offered to foreign country 2 .…”

Section: Most-favored Nation Treatmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is the WTO Passé?

Bagwell

Bown

Staiger

2016

Journal of Economic Literature

103

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The WTO has delivered policy outcomes that are very different from those likely to emerge out of the recent wave of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Should economists see this as an efficient institutional hand-off, where the WTO has carried trade liberalization as far as it can manage, and is now passing the baton to PTAs to finish the job? We survey a growing economics literature on international trade agreements and argue on this basis that the WTO is not passé. Rather, and subject to some caveats, our survey of research to date suggests that the WTO warrants strong support while a more cautious view of PTAs seems appropriate. (JEL F13, F14, K33, N70)

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Section: Most-favored Nation Treatmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is the WTO Passé?

Bagwell

Bown

Staiger

2016

Journal of Economic Literature

103

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“…Schwartz and Sykes (1997) argue that the MFN rule addresses a potential problem of concession erosion.…”

Section: Differential Treatment and Conditionality In Tariff Prefementioning

confidence: 99%

A Preference for Development: The Law and Economics of GSP

Grossman¹,

Dunoff²,

Kenners³

2007

WTO Law and Developing Countries

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“…I. Schwartz and Sykes (1997) argue that the MFN rule addresses a potential problem of concession erosion. Suppose country B receives a concession from country A in the course of a trade negotiation, and that country B is not entitled to MFN treatment from country A.…”

Section: Differential Treatment and Conditionality In Tariff Preferenmentioning

confidence: 99%

European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (WT/DS246/AB/R)

Grossman

2006

World Trade Review

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The WTO case brought by India in 2002 to challenge aspects of the European Communities’ Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) brings fresh scrutiny to a policy area that has received little attention in recent years – trade preferences for developing countries. The idea for such preferences emerged from the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. The ensuing negotiations led to Resolution 21(ii) at the second session of UNCTAD in 1968, acknowledging “unanimous agreement” in favor of the establishment of preferential arrangements. Tariff discrimination violates the most-favored nation (MFN) obligation of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Art. I, however, and thus the legal authority for preferential tariff schemes had to await a GATT waiver of this obligation, which came in 1971. The waiver was to expire after 10 years, but the authority for preferences was extended by the GATT Contracting Parties Decision of November 28, 1979 on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, popularly known as the “Enabling Clause,” and now incorporated into the law of the WTO along with the GATT itself.

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The economics of the most favored nation clause

Cited by 31 publications

References 0 publications

Is the WTO Passé?

Is the WTO Passé?

A Preference for Development: The Law and Economics of GSP

European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (WT/DS246/AB/R)

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