The EEAS’ discretionary power within the Eastern Partnership: in search of the highest possible denominator

Non-exclusive delegation to the European External Action Service

“…The principal-agent model is also increasingly used to understand the interaction between the member states and the newly created EEAS (Dijkstra 2013(Dijkstra , 2016Furness 2013;Kostanyan and Orbie 2013;Kostanyan 2014a, b;Henökl 2014). This is understandable since the hierarchical relationship is relatively straightforward: the member states are in charge of the CFSP and the EEAS helps them to formulate and implement foreign policy.…”

Agent Interaction as a Source of Discretion for the EU High Representative

“…This interpretation of multiple agent relationships as additional check and oversight mechanisms through competition has been adopted quite broadly in analyses of EU external relations. Kostanyan and Orbie (2013) identify institutional checks of the European Commission and other EU bodies in the Eastern Partnership framework that constrain the activity of the EEAS. Klein (2010) identifies that the Commission installed "horizontal controls" vis-à-vis the general-Secretariat of the Council in the area of EU crisis management.…”

Theorising the EU’s Diplomatic Service: Rational Player or Social Body?

“…The basic assumption in the principal-agent argument is that the principal can empower an agent to carry out particular actions through a more or less fonnal contract. The member states (and sometimes the Commission) are seen as the principals holding the agent (the EEAS)in control (Kostanyan and Orbie, 2013 …”