No abstract

No abstract

No abstract

Through application of the principal-agent model, this article investigates the rationales behind the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The study argues that although the EEAS was designed to become the heart of the EU external actions, it has not been given a role of ensuring the credibility of the principals’ commitments. In addition, the blame shifting logic that makes the delegation of powers attractive is only partially applicable to the EEAS. Conversely, the efficiency rationale, which includes developing and centralising expertise, resolving incomplete contracting, minimising costs, and improving decision-making procedures, is somewhat pertinent to the EEAS’s establishment. Empirical findings provide a basis for upgrading the principal-agent model by including ‘coherence’ as a rationale for agency creation.

By applying the rational choice principal–agent model, this article examines the European Union member states’ principal control of the European External Action Service (eeas) agent. More specifically, the article applies mechanisms of agency monitoring, control and sanctions that are inherent in the principal–agent model to analyse the establishment and functioning of the eeas. These mechanisms aim to ensure the eeas’s compliance with its mandate, thereby curtailing its ability to pursue own objectives that are independent from the principal. The findings reveal that the eeas is tightly controlled by the eu member states. Moreover the European Commission has tools to exercise horizontal checks vis-à-vis the eeas. The application of the principal–agent model to control the eeas is not without its limits. The model falls short of conceptualizing the role of the European Parliament, which remains an outlier to this model.