1959
DOI: 10.1037/h0047707
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The effect of emotion on cue utilization and the organization of behavior.

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Cited by 2,685 publications
(1,788 citation statements)
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References 107 publications
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“…Notably, our new ERP results show that temporarily increasing affective state reliably influences this two-stage attention process taking place in the visual cortex early on following stimulus onset, indicated by a more efficient and earlier filtering of irrelevant information in this negative relative to a more positive affective state. This mechanism could eventually account for dynamic changes in attentional focus typically observed in several behavioral tasks after the induction of negative affect (Derryberry and Reed, 1998;Derryberry and Tucker, 1993;Easterbrook 1959).…”
Section: Two-stage Model Of Attention Selection Influenced By Affectmentioning
confidence: 96%
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“…Notably, our new ERP results show that temporarily increasing affective state reliably influences this two-stage attention process taking place in the visual cortex early on following stimulus onset, indicated by a more efficient and earlier filtering of irrelevant information in this negative relative to a more positive affective state. This mechanism could eventually account for dynamic changes in attentional focus typically observed in several behavioral tasks after the induction of negative affect (Derryberry and Reed, 1998;Derryberry and Tucker, 1993;Easterbrook 1959).…”
Section: Two-stage Model Of Attention Selection Influenced By Affectmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…With regards to attention, not only increases of the C1 to attended visual stimuli were shown, but also substantial reductions of this same early visual component to unattended or task-irrelevant stimuli were evidenced, suggesting flexible and adaptive gain control mechanisms exerted by putative fronto-parietal networks onto lower tier visual cortex, 2009, 2011b) and emotion control (Stolarova er al., 2006) by themselves yield amplitude modulations of the C1 component during visual perception, we hypothesized a possible combined effect of the two factors influencing this early visual evoked component. More precisely, because negative affect typically leads to a narrowing of spatial attentional focus (Derryberry and Reed, 1998;Derryberry and Tucker, 1993;Easterbrook, 1959), we surmised that the transient induction of a negative affective state may alter the normal attentional filtering in V1. Therefore, we predicted that normal early load-dependent attention effects at the level of the C1 in response to peripheral, irrelevant stimuli, may be altered after the induction of state anxiety, relative to a control condition.…”
Section: Permeability Of Human V1 To Cognitive Factorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, anxiety leads to decrements in executive function (Eysenck et al, 2007), a critical ingredient for resisting egocentric interference when reasoning about others' differing perspectives (Fizke, Barthel, Peters, & Rakoczy, 2014;Lin et al, 2010). Second, anxiety heightens self-focused attention (Easterbrook, 1959;Sarason, 1975), which itself can increase reliance on self-knowledge during social prediction (Fenigstein & Abrams, 1993). Third, anxiety is typically accompanied by a sense of uncertainty (Lazarus, 1991;Lerner & Keltner, 2000;Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), which itself is associated with greater reliance on accessible knowledge during judgment (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000;Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).…”
Section: Anxiety and Mental-state Reasoningmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similarly, there tends to be less processing of peripheral cues in negative states such as anxiety (Easterbrook, 1959). Individuals experiencing happy moods are more likely to consider fringe exemplars of categories as category members than are those in a neutral mood (Isen & Daubman, 1984), whereas depressed people form narrower categories than elated or neutral individuals when carrying out an open-ended categorisation task (Murray, Sujan, Hirt & Sujan, 1990).…”
Section: Encouragingmentioning
confidence: 99%