The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: An experimental study

Brindisi, Francesco; Çelen, Boğaçhan; Hyndman, Kyle

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.018

Cited by 16 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…The literature on global games, which studies outcomes when players are uncertain about a common fundamental, differs from our theoretical framework, but we consider it important to discuss here given the strategic complementarity of these games. For example, Brindisi et al (2014) find that in an investment game endogenous timing improves social welfare. Their results indicate that while coordination is higher under endogenous timing, it is still lower than predicted.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

An Endogenous-Timing Conflict Game

Park

Rabanal

Rud³

et al. 2020

SSRN Journal

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We present an endogenous-timing conflict game of incomplete information under strategic complementarity. The model predicts multiple equilibria, in which the outcome follows either a simultaneous move game (Baliga and Sjöström, 2004) or a sequential game, which improves social welfare. We study the three families of games in the laboratory using gender-balanced sessions. Our results suggest that:(i) social welfare is higher in the endogenous-timing and sequential games compared to the simultaneous game; (ii) men and women make similar decisions in the simultaneous and sequential-move games; and (iii) in the endogenous-timing game women are less willing to commit to the risky action.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

An Endogenous-Timing Conflict Game

Park

Rabanal

Rud³

et al. 2020

SSRN Journal

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“…A sizeable literature exists on signaling asymmetric information in endogenous timing games, see e.g. Daughety andReinganum (1994), Normann (1997), and Brindisi et al (2014).…”

Section: Information Sharingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly

Leppänen

2019

Ann Oper Res

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A duopoly game with timing announcements endogenizes the sequence of commitments. In duopolistic price competition, endogenous moves lead to a coordination problem with two non-Pareto ranked subgame perfect equilibria (SPEs). In these SPEs both firms prefer followership to leadership. We suggest that a unique SPE can be found if firms use partial commitments to their timing announcements. Using partial commitments, the firms first announce the timing of moves but reserve the option to deviate from this announcement and pay a deviation cost. We show that given a sufficient asymmetry in stochastic production technologies, there exists a unique SPE with sequential moves if the deviation costs are sufficiently different or if a common deviation cost belongs to a suitable interval. We also discuss the information sharing implications of the results and find that information is not shared at the unique SPE.

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“…8 The linear model generalizes to one in which instead of rewarding early adoption there is a cost or penalty to late adoption. Similar to the examples used in Brindisi et al (2011) in which late adopters pay higher costs, payoffs become π(i; σ) = bc(µ c i ) − be(µ c i − µ e i ) where bc is the per member conformity payoff and be is the cost associated with each player who acts concurrent or in advance of player i on the same alternative. With bc = rc + re and be = re, the two scenarios are isomorphic.…”

Section: Strategic Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Conformity and Influence

Goldbaum

2018

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

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I model the behavior of decision-makers seeking conformity and influence in a connected population. The model allows for one-sided linking, with information flowing from the target to the link’s originator. Conformity is achieved only with a social order, necessitating differentiated rewards despite ex ante homogeneity. The leader holds a strategic social location ex post, exerting influence independent of any leadership traits. A strong desire to influence produces non-conforming autonomous decision-makers. Socially detrimental multiple leaders can be sustained as well.

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The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: An experimental study

Cited by 16 publications

References 30 publications

An Endogenous-Timing Conflict Game

An Endogenous-Timing Conflict Game

Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly

Conformity and Influence

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