The effect of figure on syllogistic reasoning

Dickstein, Louis S.

doi:10.3758/bf03197431

Cited by 105 publications

(56 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Sixteen syllogistic problem frames were used (see Appendix D): Eight problem frames controlled for atmosphere (Begg & Denny, 1969), conversion (Dickstein, 1975(Dickstein, , 1981Revlin, Leirer, Yopp, & Yopp, 1980), and figural effects (Dickstein, 1978), and eight controlled for atmosphere and figure, but not conversion. Although the design of this experiment did not require control of these structural effects, this decision allowed use of exactly the same problem frames in Experiments 2 and 3, where conclusion believability was manipulated.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing the belief bias effect with ROCs: It's a response bias effect

Dubé¹,

Rotello²,

Heit³

2009

PsycEXTRA Dataset

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A belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983) is observed when subjects accept more valid than invalid arguments and more believable than unbelievable conclusions and show greater overall accuracy in judging arguments with unbelievable conclusions. The effect is measured with a contrast of contrasts, comparing the acceptance rates for valid and invalid arguments with believable and unbelievable conclusions. We show that use of this measure entails the assumption of a threshold model, which predicts linear receiver operating characteristics (ROCs). In 3 experiments, subjects made "valid"/"invalid" responses to syllogisms, followed by confidence ratings that allowed the construction of empirical ROCs; ROCs were also constructed from a base-rate manipulation in one experiment. In all cases, the form of the empirical ROCs was curved and therefore inconsistent with the assumptions of Klauer, Musch, and Naumer's (2000) multinomial model of belief bias. We propose a more appropriate, signal detection-based model of belief bias. We then use that model to develop theoretically sound and empirically justified measures of decision accuracy and response bias; those measures demonstrate that the belief bias effect is simply a response bias effect. Thus, our data and analyses challenge existing theories of belief bias because those theories predict an accuracy effect that our data suggest is a Type I error. Our results also provide support for processing theories of deduction that assume responses are driven by a graded argument-strength variable, such as the probability heuristic model proposed by Chater and Oaksford (1999).

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing the belief bias effect with ROCs: It's a response bias effect

Dubé¹,

Rotello²,

Heit³

2009

PsycEXTRA Dataset

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“…Hence, we will refer to these two figures as "indeterminate", and to the two figures that yield valid conclusions as "determinate". There are well known figural effects in syllogistic reasoning (Dickstein, 1978;García-Madruga, 1982;Johnson-Laird & Steedman, 1978). In particular, premises of the form: A-B, B-C, tend to yield conclusions of the form: A-C; whereas premises of the form B-A, C-B, tend to yield conclusions of the form C-A, regardless of whether the conclusions are valid or invalid.…”

Section: Double Conditionalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reasoning From Double Conditionals: The Effects of Logical Structure and Believability

Santamaría¹,

García-Madruga²,

Johnson‐Laird³

1998

Thinking & Reasoning

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We report three experimental studies of reasoning with double conditionals, i.e. problems based on premises of the form:If A then B.If B then C. where A, B, and C, describe everyday events. We manipulated both the logical structure of the problems, using all four possible arrangements (or "figures" of their constituents, A, B, and C, and the believability of the two salient conditional conclusions that might follow from them, i.e. If A then C, or If C then A. The experiments showed that with figures for which there was a valid conclusion, the participants more often, and more rapidly, drew the valid conclusion when it was believable than when it was unbelievable. With figures for which there were no valid conclusions, the participants tended to draw whichever of the two conclusions was believable. These results were predicted by the theory that reasoning depends on constructing mental models of the premises.

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“…It is proposed that another source of error for this premise combination results from conversion of the valid 0 conclusion that results from backward processing. Support for the occurrence of backward processing on this and other premise combinations not considered in this paper has been presented elsewhere (Dickstein, 1978). Thus, subjects should make two different kinds of errors for this premise combination.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…In recent years, several investigators have concerned themselves with the cognitive processes involved in performance on abstract categorical syllogisms (e.g., Dickstein, 1975Dickstein, , 1976Dickstein, , 1978Erickson, 1974;Revlis, 1975aRevlis, , 1975b. The general intent of these studies has been to clarify the operations that subjects perform in interpreting premises, combining information, and drawing conclusions.…”

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confidence: 99%