The effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth

Ryngaert, Michael D.

doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90051-7

Cited by 322 publications

(167 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

157

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…To identify whether a firm was affected by merger and acquisition activity, we conducted news article searches using the ABI/INFORM database to identify the presence of takeover activity. Using a three-month window on each side of the adoption date, we created a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm was subject to either takeover speculation or an actual tender offer (e.g., Ryngaert 1988). …”

Section: Independent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Golden Parachutes Unfolded: Diffusion and Variation of a Controversial Practice

Fiss

Kennedy

Davis

2012

Organization Science

132

121

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

W e contribute to a growing focus on variation in diffusion processes by examining the ways in which contested practices are modified as they spread among adopters. Expanding on prior diffusion accounts, we argue that the extensiveness and similarity of a practice will vary in response to both population-and organization-level mechanisms. To examine these issues, we study variation in "golden parachute" contracts, a controversial corporate governance practice that emerged and spread widely during the hostile takeover wave of the 1980s. Using a concept network approach to analyze the composition of parachute plans, we find evidence of mechanisms that both increase and decrease extensiveness and variation of golden parachutes. Our findings hold implications for accounts of practice diffusion over contested terrain by revealing substantial variation in the course of diffusion.

show abstract

Section: Independent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Golden Parachutes Unfolded: Diffusion and Variation of a Controversial Practice

Fiss

Kennedy

Davis

2012

Organization Science

132

121

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Leveraged buyouts are frequently financed with high debt; 10: 1 ratios of debt to equity are not uncommon, and they average 5.25:l (Schipper and Smith, 1986;Kaplan, 1987;DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1986). Moreover, the use of "strip financing" and the allocation of equity in the deals reveal a sensitivity to incentives, conflicts of interest, and bankruptcy costs.…”

Section: Leveraged Buyouts and Free Cash Flow Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Top level managers on average receive over 30 percent of the equity, and venture capitalists and the funds they represent generally retain the major share of the remainder (Schipper and Smith, 1986;Kaplan, 1987). The venture capitalists control the board of directors (in fact, they often are the board) and monitor managers directly.…”

Section: Leveraged Buyouts and Free Cash Flow Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences

2003

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) find that the adoption of supermajority amendments leads to negative equity returns. Ryngaert (1988) reports a negative equity effect when firms adopt poison pills. Ryngaert and Netter (1987) identify a negative effect associated with Ohio's anti-takeover law.…”

Section: Literature Review and Conceptual Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Survivorship and the Economic Grim Reaper

Baker¹

2002

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The ten year survival rate for firms trading on the New York and American Stock Exchanges between 1963 and 1995 is only 61%. This paper explores the process by which firms come to be delisted. We calculate the returns of firms from ten years before delisting to their delisting date and show that, on average, the economic grim reaper kills poorly performing firms. We document takeover and distress delisting rates through time, analyze pre-delisting equity market returns for both groups, and explore how firm characteristics and regulations governing corporate takeovers and bankruptcy affect the friction with which these processes operate. We believe this is the first analysis to document long-term equity market and operating performance of delisting firms. The study builds on research from both finance and industrial organization and is consistent with a Schumpeterian view of economic development.Baker 2

show abstract

The effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth

Cited by 322 publications

References 21 publications

How Golden Parachutes Unfolded: Diffusion and Variation of a Controversial Practice

How Golden Parachutes Unfolded: Diffusion and Variation of a Controversial Practice

Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences

Survivorship and the Economic Grim Reaper

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About