The Effect of Preprimary Endorsement on Competition for Nominations: An Examination of Different Nominating Systems

McNitt, Andrew D.

doi:10.2307/2130026

Cited by 6 publications

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“…The hypothesis assumes that the regular party organization has a vested interest in controlling internal conflict because competition for nomination wastes resources needed for the general election, divides party activists before the general election and reduces the chances of victory in that election. Studies of party organization which examine the effect of different nominating procedures find that there tends to be less competition for nominations in primary elections when parties make formal preprimary endorsements (Jewell and Olson, 1978: 138), when nominations are made by convention as opposed to primary election (McNitt, 1980), and when state law prohibits the use of the run-off primary (Key, 1949: 419-23). Studies of competition for nominations in open as opposed to closed primaries find, however, that contrary to logical expectations there is less competition for nominations in open primary states (Smith, 1973: 83).…”

Section: Explanations Of Competition For Nominationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Comparison of Explanations of Competition for Gubernatorial and Senatorial Nomination: 1954-1974

McNitt

1982

Western Political Quarterly

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HE NOMINATING process holds a special fascination for students t of political power in the United States. Competition for nominations JL is studied as both a measure of organizational effectiveness and as an indicator of intraparty democracy.Although a laundry list of independent variables has been proposed as explanation of competition for nominations, little attempt has been made to analyze either the relative or combined impact of these variables on competition for nominations. This paper examines the conventional hypotheses about competition for nominations using data from all gubernatorial and senatorial nominations made in the United States between 1954 and 1974.The goal of this analysis is to determine the relative influence of these individual variables on competition for nominations, and to assess the degree to which these variables in combination explain competition for nominations. EXPLANATIONS OF COMPETITION FOR NOMINATIONSMany variables have some influence on competition for nominations; however, incumbency, party competition, party organization, and constituency diversity are considered to be the most important.The incumbency hypothesis argues that the presence of an incumbent reduces competition for nominations (Key, 1956, 109-112; Jewell and Olson, 1978: 138-39). Incumbents are better known than nonincumbents (Stokes and Miller, 1966), and are more likely to win in the general election than are nonincumbents (Bullock, 1972). Consequently, by extension, incumbents should also be more likely to win nominations than nonincumbents.The decline in party identification and the subsequent increase in splitticket voting during the sixties and seventies has resulted in increased success for incumbents in general elections (Fiorina et al., 1975). The effect, however, of incumbency on competition for nominations is less well established. If the increasing reelectability of incumbents is primarily the result of declining partisanship of the electorate, then the effect of incumbency on competition for nominations probably has not changed. The general exclusion of members of the opposite party and the much lower rate of participation by independents in the nominating process insulates intraparty politics from many of the changes in the general electorate. Consequently, the decline in party identification should have relatively little impact on competition for nominations because all of the contestants for nomination belong to the same party. NOTE: I would like to thank Joseph Schlesinger for his careful comments on this research. I would also like to thank James Seroka and the anonymous reviewers for reviewing earlier versions of this manuscript.

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Section: Explanations Of Competition For Nominationsmentioning

confidence: 99%