The Effect of ‘Stabilization’ in the Mandates and Practice of UN Peace Operations

Abstract

In the last decade UN peace operations have begun to explicitly seek 'stabilization' in the states to which they are deployed. Despite the term being included in the titles of four missions, three of which are amongst the four largest operations currently deployed, and stabilization activities being included in the mandates, there is no UN-wide interpretation of the term. Instead, the mandates include varying activities under the heading of stabilization depending on the mission. Concurrently, stabilization missions have seen the use of language such as 'robust posture' and 'active patrolling', increased logistical capabilities from Western military hardware, the encroachment of a counter-terrorism rhetoric, operations alongside host state forces, and an emphasis on (re)establishing the rule of law. This article examines the legal effects these trends could have. Due to the competing interests introduced by stabilization it is suggested that the mandates issued by the UN Security Council require further clarity and harmonisation to prevent the pursuit of lasting peace from being undermined.

Le risque d’une justice à double vitesse ?

“…En effet, le débat sur le statut des missions de maintien de la paix ne se limite pas au Mali, mais s'inscrit dans un contexte général de glissement vers les opérations de « stabilisation » au début des années 2010 40 , avec les caractéristiques suivantes : un mandat « robuste » voire offensif, une approche intégrée civile et militaire, un soutien affiché à l'État hôte, et un appui par des forces internationales 41 . En RDC, par exemple, plusieurs auteurs ont analysé finement le statut de la MONUSCO et ont conclu qu'elle était devenue une partie au conflit, donc la cible légitime d'attaques 42 .…”

Stabilization Operations and Their Relationship to Liberal Peacebuilding Missions

“…While increasing referring to stabilization for this type of operations, the UN has left its understanding of the term mostly implicit, thus creating the conditions for different interpretations. The mandates of the four missions deployed by the UN Security Council with a stabilization component offer a profusion of meanings of the term, involving activities as disparate as the use of force, the protection of civilians, the strengthening of host state's authority, the development of democratic institutions and the rule of law, the demobilization of combatants, and the implementation of quick impact projects (Gilder 2019). Not only each of these elements has been given a different weight in each mission, but their relative importance also changed overtime.…”

“…The binary distinction between legitimate and terrorist groups may prevent the identification of those political problems that need to be addressed in order to reach an agreed-upon settlement and risks threatening the possibility of pursuing a peace operation's other priorities. In particular, the possibility that the UN could act as an impartial arbitrator is diminished by being an active part of the conflict, and thus the pursuit of an inclusive peace and national reconciliation is undermined (Gilder 2019).…”

The turn from peacebuilding to stabilisation: Colombia after the 2018 presidential election

“…The relatively recent adoption of stabilisation by the United Nations (UN), in particular, has led to concerns that stabilisation is displacing or compromising better approaches to build peace in post-conflict countries. Critics of stabilisation argue that the rebranding of post-conflict interventions as stabilisation is leading to an increasing focus on security at the expense of broader peacebuilding needs and a reduced commitment to support peace negotiations (Karlsrud 2019;Belloni and Moro 2019;Curran and Holtom 2015;Gilder 2019;Mac Ginty 2012). However, while numerous scholarly publications investigate stabilisation ARTICLE HISTORY in the context of UN peace operations and European and North American post-conflict interventions, there has been little discussion until now -with some exceptions (Harig 2019;Muggah 2013) -about how post-conflict countries affected by political and criminal violence have themselves engaged with the discourse and practices of stabilisation and, in some cases, even contributed to their development.…”

“…Consequently, the implications of the embracement of stabilisation for these countries have also not been analysed in depth. Moreover, much of the recent literature emphasises the novelty of stabilisation (Curran and Holtom 2015;Belloni and Moro 2019;Gilder 2019;Karlsrud 2019;Howard and Stark 2018), neglecting its historical continuity with a long tradition of COIN and 'pacification' (Barakat, Deely, and Zyck 2010),…”