snfrstruturl stte pity for demortiztionc oter registrtion nd identifition in g¢ ote d9svoire nd qhn ompred his item ws sumitted to voughorough niversity9s snstitutionl epository y theGn uthorF Citation: sggyvsxyD qFD PHITF snfrstruturl stte pity for demoE rtiztionc oter registrtion nd identifition in g¢ ote d9svoire nd qhn ompredF hemortiztionD PQ@QAD ppF RWVESIWF Additional Information:• his is n eepted wnusript of n rtile pulished y ylor 8 prnis in hemortiztion on PQrd pe PHISD ville onlineX httpXGGdxFdoiForgGIHFIHVHGIQSIHQRUFPHIRFWVQWHT GermanyA large portion of electoral irregularities in developing countries stem from administrative deficiencies, rather than deliberate fraud. This is particularly evident when it comes to voter registration and identification: the quality of a voter list depends from the existence of effective mechanisms to register and identify citizens and electors, which might not be easily at hand in many developing countries. Democratization in these countries has been accompanied by intense polemics about the quality of the voter rolls and the identification of electors, which have threatened democratic consolidation. Biometrics technology has been recently heralded as a possible solution, but its effective potential is disputable. In order to understand how problems with registering and identifying voters have affected democratization, this paper reviews the contrasting experiences of Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. In Côte d'Ivoire, the problem of the reliability of the voter register has been entangled since the '90s with the politicization of the citizenship question. As a consequence, compiling an acceptable voter register has proven extremely difficult and cumbersome. In Ghana, an effective electoral administration has been key to overcome the mistrust of the political parties about the fairness of the voter process.

No abstract

The Colombian Peace Agreement signed in 2016 was saluted internationally by scholars, policy makers and practitioners for encompassing the concept of territorial peace as a means of ensuring local participation in the strengthening of state institutions. Based on engaged research conducted in the Department of Cauca and Bogotá between 2017 and 2020, we critically analyse territorial peace, exploring its ideation, implementation, and subsequent decline in favour of security and stabilisation. We argue that the government’s peacebuilding rationale and mechanisms sought to reinforce the neoliberal state through a constrained participation model, which marginalised the progressive struggles of local communities living in former conflict affected areas. Without a radical breakdown of pre‐existing power structures of exploitation and domination, community participation in peacebuilding runs the risk of legitimising state‐led initiatives that ensure the political rule of capital, strengthen the bureaucracies of the centralised state, and create new violent disputes without resolving existing ones.

The literature on peacebuilding has increasingly emphasized the importance of the local level -a trend that has been called the local turn. For some researchers, the local turn can improve international peacebuilding interventions, while for others it is an agenda to promote an emancipatory and legitimate peace. There is however mixed evidence backing the argument that addressing local level issues in peacebuilding can make a substantial difference. The local turn reposes on assumptions that appear particularly problematic in an environment characterised by the lack of an elite-level pact, such as a conflict terminated in a military victory. Looking at the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, which terminated in 2011 with the defeat of former president Laurent Gbagbo, this paper highlights how the lack of elite level reconciliation compromises the effectiveness of actions aiming to promote local 'social cohesion'. It also shows how the discourse and practices of the local turn can be appropriated by semi-authoritarian post-conflict governments in order to depoliticize the peacebuilding process. It concludes that the popularity of the 'local turn' among peacebuilders might be due more to the 2 opportunity that it offers to eschew delicate national-level political issues, than to its supposed emancipatory potential.

In 2011, Côte d'Ivoire emerged from a protracted politico-military crisis not through peace negotiations, but thanks to the military defeat of former president Laurent Gbagbo and his associates. Relatively little has been written about the restoration of peace after a decisive military victory and about experiences of post-conflict reconstructions where the international community does not play a leading role. Quantitative scholarship has contended that victory makes restoring peace relatively uncomplicated. In contrast, strategic scholarship has insisted that winning the war does not automatically mean 'winning the peace'. Victors, especially former insurgents, have to maintain cohesion within the winning coalition and to co-opt or repress residual resistance from the vanquished if they want to consolidate their rule. Moreover, former insurgents often struggle to implement their vision of post-conflict governance. In Côte d'Ivoire, the winning coalition showed risks of implosion after 2011, but has been up to now able to contain them. The Ouattara administration has been able to develop its own vision of post conflict reconstruction, drawing from Ivorian political tradition and the president's distinctive personality.However, this political project faces future obstacles, particularly in view of Ouattara's probable retirement from politics in 2020.