The effect of stakes in distribution experiments

Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Verhoogen, Eric; Burks, Stephen V.

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2004.08.007

Cited by 175 publications

(129 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…individual motivations not restricted to one's own well-being but including the well-being of others (Camerer and Fehr, 2004). Marginal totals are well-documented for various populations (Camerer, 2003;Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008;Henrich et al, 2010) and stake levels (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999;Carpenter et al, 2005). Each protocol is easily understandable by participants of different social backgrounds and training.…”

Section: Experimental Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Carpenter et al, 2005;Forsythe et al, 1994;Hoffman et al, 1996): Stakes induce involvement and effort in memory and learning tasks but are hardly a leverage in economic games. "When behavior does change, incentives can be interpreted as shifting behavior away from an overly socially-desirable presentation of oneself to a more realistic one" (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999, p. 8).…”

Section: Monetary Stakesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008;Forsythe et al, 1994; Sefton 1992) but does not affect proposer behavior in the UG (e.g. Cameron, 1999;Carpenter et al, 2005;Hoffman et al, 1996). UG responders, on the other hand, reduce their percentage threshold for acceptable offers when endowments are greater.…”

Section: Monetary Stakesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Forsythe et al, 1994;Munier and Zaharia, 2002;Slonim and Roth, 1998). Most studies raise stakes from $5 to $10 (Forsythe et al, 1994) or from $10 to $100 (Carpenter et al, 2005;Hoffman et al, 1996). Others induce much larger incentives (Andersen et al, 2011;Cameron, 1999;Slonim and Roth, 1998).…”

Section: Monetary Stakesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Most likely it is the change from $0 to PPP$1 that makes a behavioral difference, shifting outcomes towards the standard prediction (cf., Carpenter et al 2005):…”

Section: Monetary Stakesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Using crowdsourced online experiments to study context-dependency of behavior

Keuschnigg

Bader

Bracher

2016

Social Science Research

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We use Mechanical Turk's diverse participant pool to conduct online bargaining games in India and the US. First, we assess internal validity of crowdsourced experimentation through variation of stakes ($0, $1, $4, and $10) in the Ultimatum and Dictator Game. For cross-country equivalence we adjust the stakes following differences in purchasing power. Our marginal totals correspond closely to laboratory findings. Monetary incentives induce more selfish behavior but, in line with most laboratory findings, the particular size of a positive stake appears irrelevant. Second, by transporting a homogeneous decision situation into various living conditions crowdsourced experimentation permits identification of context effects on elicited behavior. We explore contextdependency using session-level variation in participants' geographical location, regional affluence, and local social capital. Across "virtual pools" behavior varies in the range of stake effects. We argue that quasi-experimental variation of the characteristics people bring to the experimental situation is the key potential of crowdsourced online designs.

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Section: Experimental Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Monetary Stakesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Monetary Stakesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Monetary Stakesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Most likely it is the change from $0 to PPP$1 that makes a behavioral difference, shifting outcomes towards the standard prediction (cf., Carpenter et al 2005):…”

Section: Monetary Stakesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Using crowdsourced online experiments to study context-dependency of behavior

Keuschnigg

Bader

Bracher

2016

Social Science Research

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Influence of peer information and personality on social exclusion in a three‐person dictator game

Königstein,

Zschoche,

Brown

et al. 2024

Manage Decis Econ

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We study the conflict between financial interests and prosocial behavior in a new variant of a three‐person dictator game, which we refer to as “social exclusion game.” In this game, one person, the dictator, decides whether all three players (the dictator and two receivers) receive the fair outcome (equal payoffs) or an unfair outcome, which excludes one of the receivers and raises the dictator's payoff. We elicit the minimal payment necessary to induce the dictator to exclude the third person and investigate how this is influenced by peer information and the Big Five personality factor agreeableness. The data support our hypotheses.

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Culture of trust and division of labor in nonhierarchical teams

Meier

Stephenson²,

Perkowski

2019

Strategic Management Journal

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Research Summary: Firms exhibit heterogeneity in size, productivity, and internal structure, and this is true even within the same industry. Our paper provides evidence of a link between an organization's culture-specifically the trust environment-and its level of specialization. We show experimentally that exogenously-imposed culture endogenously leads to variation in organizational form. We prime trust and demonstrate that the level of trust within an organization affects division of labor and consequently productivity in nonhierarchical teams. This evidence is consistent with a cross-country link between trust and the division of labor that we observe in data from the European Social Survey. Managerial Summary: Firms vary among many dimensions such as culture and internal organization even within the same industry. Trust is one component of corporate culture that is crucial for cooperation within organizations. In this paper, we show that the trust dimension of corporate culture can affect firm performance through internal structure, in particular the degree of division of labor. Using evidence from a game-theoretic model, a lab experiment, and country-level data, we show that an increase in trust leads to increased worker specialization. Our results suggest that increasing trust in work environments where division of labor is beneficial is one way to boost team productivity. K E Y W O R D Sculture, division of labor, experiments, organizational structure, trust

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The effect of stakes in distribution experiments

Abstract: We replicate previous results showing that stakes do not affect offers in the Ultimatum Game and show that stakes also have no effect on allocations in the Dictator Game. Both results are robust to the inclusion of demographic factors.

Cited by 175 publications

References 16 publications

Using crowdsourced online experiments to study context-dependency of behavior

Using crowdsourced online experiments to study context-dependency of behavior

Influence of peer information and personality on social exclusion in a three‐person dictator game

Culture of trust and division of labor in nonhierarchical teams

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