The Election Commission of India and the Regulation and Administration of Electoral Politics

McMillan, Alistair

doi:10.1089/elj.2011.0134

Cited by 13 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…The ECI also supervises the creation of a register of eligible voters, enrollment which is automatic. The commission is widely regarded as politically neutral and relatively efficient (McMillan, 2012), and takes extensive measures to guarantee the security of voters and the neutrality of the electoral process. Note that the national administration of election and common ballot structure means that these factors are unlikely to cause spatial variation in elections, unlike the United States (Stein et al , 2008; Herrnson et al , 2012).…”

Section: Electronic Voting In Indiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Technology and protest: the political effects of electronic voting in India

Desai

Lee

2019

PSRM

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Electronic voting technology is often proposed as translating voter intent to vote totals better than alternative systems such as paper ballots. We suggest that electronic voting machines (EVMs) can also alter vote choice, and, in particular, the way in which voters register anti-system sentiment. This paper examines the effects of the introduction of EVMs in India, the world's largest democracy, using a difference-in-differences methodology that takes advantage of the technology's gradual introduction. We find that EVMs are associated with dramatic declines in the incidence of invalid votes, and corresponding increases in vote for minor candidates. There is ambiguous evidence for EVMs decreasing turnout, no evidence for increases in rough proxies of voter error or fraud, and no evidence that machines with an auditable paper trail perform differently from other EVMs. The results highlight the interaction between voter technology and voter protest, and the substitutability of different types of protest voting.

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Section: Electronic Voting In Indiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Technology and protest: the political effects of electronic voting in India

Desai

Lee

2019

PSRM

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“…In the 2004 NES, 80% of respondents believed elections to be free and fair (Lokniti, 2008). 3 We benefit from important work on the EC, including Gilmartin and Moog (2012), McMillan (2010McMillan ( , 2012, and Sridharan and Vaishnav (2017). 4 For causal process observations in within-case analysis, see Goertz and Mahoney (2012).…”

Section: Acknowledgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The same holds true for state assembly elections. The EC's efforts to ensure free and fair elections allowed it to justify longer election duration and also to become perhaps the most powerful unelected body in India (McMillan, ).…”

Section: Institutional Development and Evidence Of Mandate Expansionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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From quiescent bureaucracy to “undocumented wonder”: Explaining the Indian Election Commission's expanding mandate

Ahuja

Ostermann

2018

Governance

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Public institutions in the developing world are often characterized by institutional capture or decay. Yet, India's Election Commission (EC) has become one of its most powerful regulatory bodies. We use a process‐tracing approach to explain the EC's surprising expansion of mandate, arguing that in a federal democracy: (a) when institutional constraints are weakened, (b) when state‐based actors demand a competent and neutral arbiter, and (c) when entrepreneurial bureaucratic actors take advantage of moments of political opportunity, those aspects of the bureaucracy that can credibly meet these demands are able to successfully expand their powers. Changes in Model Code Implementation and Election Duration attest to the EC's broader role. The EC's experience suggests that a weak executive can facilitate the strengthening of state institutions and that, under federalism, state‐based electoral forces can produce strong national institutions.

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“…The EC had popular support, which explains its confidence and tough stance vis-à-vis political parties regarding the enforcement of electoral procedures including the Code during elections. In many situations, it has also extended its legal authority and exceeded its constitutional mandate (McMillan, 2012, p. 199). The way it has taken on the political parties and locked horns with them over matter of proper conduct during elections shows that it finds strength in the implicit mass support it gets.…”

Section: Political Parties and Electoral Conductmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mass Politics and Institutional Restraint: Political Parties and the Election Commission of India

Katju

2016

Studies in Indian Politics

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This article looks at the working of institutional relationships in Indian politics. It explores the interaction between Indian political parties and the Election Commission of India to highlight the dynamics of political praxis and institutional restraint, and while doing so endorses the view that institutional regulation is a vital part of a free and fair democratic exercise. It also argues that the institutional 'logic of appropriateness' is being transformed at a time of greater participation in political competition in India: the number of candidates contesting the polls has grown phenomenally, as has the number of people coming out to vote. In this context, regulation and restraint have assumed an importance essential for responsible political practice and the institutionalization of the multiparty system itself.This article focuses on the working of institutional relationships in Indian politics. It explores the nature of interaction between Indian political parties and the Election Commission of India (hereafter EC), and the implication of this relationship for Indian democracy. Political parties represent political praxis and public opinion, whereas institutions such as the EC regulate political praxis through institutional checks. This article makes an attempt to answer the following questions: What has been the relation between political parties and the EC in India within the dynamics of the agency-structure relationship? Do political representatives, that is, those representing political agency, feel reasonably able to articulate their interests within the existing institutional regulations, or do they regard the latter as unjustified constraints on democratic exercise? Do the political restraints imposed by institutions hinder democratic exercise or are they needed to restrain abuses of power? And, following from this, are rules and ruleenforcing bodies needed for the democratic functioning of political praxis in India, or can the political system autonomously manage disagreements on its own?To answer these questions, the article looks at some instances since the early 2000s-a time when tensions between political parties and the EC over electoral procedure in India saw a visible growth

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The Election Commission of India and the Regulation and Administration of Electoral Politics

Cited by 13 publications

References 9 publications

Technology and protest: the political effects of electronic voting in India

Technology and protest: the political effects of electronic voting in India

From quiescent bureaucracy to “undocumented wonder”: Explaining the Indian Election Commission's expanding mandate

Mass Politics and Institutional Restraint: Political Parties and the Election Commission of India

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